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The Stigma of Conviction: Coram Nobis, Civil 
Disabilities, and the Right to Clear One’s Name 
David Wolitz 
I. ABSTRACT 
In the 1954 case of United States v. Morgan, the Supreme Court 
revived the ancient writ of coram nobis by making it the sole 
mechanism for post-incarceration judicial review of federal 
convictions. It appeared that coram nobis was well on its way to 
taking its place as a vital part of the American system of collateral 
review. Where the writ of habeas corpus provided unlawfully 
convicted prisoners with a way to challenge their conviction, coram 
nobis offered a similar avenue of relief for those who were no longer 
in federal custody. But the promise of modern coram nobis has been 
held in check by a restrictive doctrine known as the civil disabilities 
test. In most federal circuits today, a coram nobis petitioner must 
show that he or she is suffering a distinct and ongoing legal harm—a 
“civil disability”—before a court will review the underlying 
conviction. The Seventh Circuit, Judge Easterbrook in particular, led 
the way in creating the now-prevalent civil disabilities test by arguing 
that such a test is necessary to promote the values of finality and 
judicial economy. But the test means that many people who were 
unlawfully and erroneously convicted never have a chance to 
challenge their convictions in court. This Article argues that the civil 
disabilities test is inconsistent with the essential nature and important 
function of post-Morgan coram nobis relief. The test does very little 
to promote the values of finality and judicial economy, and its 
application leads to grave departures from the fundamental norm of 
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accuracy. Moreover, the test disregards the devastating reputational, 
professional, and social consequences of conviction. Those who are 
stigmatized by an unlawful conviction should be able to obtain 
collateral relief. And coram nobis, a form of relief which the Court 
recently re-affirmed in United States v. Denedo, should not be 
weighed down by the overly restrictive civil disabilities test.  
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II. INTRODUCTION 
In 1942, the United States prosecuted Gordon Hirabayashi and 
Fred Korematsu for failing to follow orders aimed at removing all 
people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast of the United 
States. Hirabayashi and Korematsu challenged the legality of those 
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orders, and they have become part of American legal history thanks 
to the Supreme Court cases that bear their names. In those cases, the 
Court accepted the government’s position that military exigency, 
rather than racial animus, motivated the relocation of all West Coast 
Japanese Americans, and the Court affirmed their convictions.1 
Those convictions stood on the books for over forty years, until 
1984 in the case of Korematsu2 and 1987 in the case of 
Hirabayashi.3 
An obscure post-conviction writ called coram nobis played an 
important part in the vindication of Korematsu and Hirabayashi. The 
writ of coram nobis, like habeas corpus, empowers a court to vacate 
the petitioner’s conviction upon a showing that such conviction was 
unlawful.4 The difference between the two writs is that habeas is 
available only to those who are “in custody”—that is, in prison or 
other forms of supervision deemed “custody”—while coram nobis is 
available only to those who are no longer, or never were, in custody.5 
As Korematsu and Hirabayashi had long since left federal custody 
when they filed for collateral relief, coram nobis was the only writ 
available to them and their only hope for vacating their convictions.6 
Fortunately for Korematsu and Hirabayashi, federal courts in the 
Ninth Circuit granted their coram nobis claims and vacated their 
Internment-era convictions—allowing “the judgments of the courts 
[to] conform to the judgments of history.”7 But those convictions 
would still be on the books today had they faced the restrictive 
coram nobis jurisprudence favored by a majority of federal courts. In 
 
 1. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100–01 (1943). 
 2. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting writ of 
coram nobis). 
 3. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987) (granting writ of coram 
nobis). The story of how the country came to recognize the injustice in those convictions, and 
how the federal courts finally and belatedly vacated those convictions, is a great narrative of 
personal vindication, national reconciliation, and systemic self-correction. See generally PETER 
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 
(1993). 
 4. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(describing nature of writ of coram nobis). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Sandles, 469 F.3d 508, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting 
petition for writ of coram nobis, among other reasons, because litigant was still “in custody” 
and thus should have petitioned for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 
 6. See Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1412; Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 604. 
 7. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 593. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1280 
most circuits today, a petitioner wishing to vacate what he believes to 
be an unlawful conviction must first prove to the court that he is 
suffering a distinct legal harm—a civil disability—as a result of the 
allegedly unlawful conviction.8 Civil disabilities range from 
disenfranchisement to loss of professional licenses to ineligibility for 
certain welfare benefits.9 But by the mid-1980s Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi were no longer suffering from any distinct civil 
disabilities, and the chance that they would face any such 
consequences in the future was negligible. Korematsu was a self-
employed draftsman living in San Leandro, California,10 and 
Hirabayashi was a professor emeritus of sociology at the University 
of Alberta.11 They could not point to any specific and ongoing legal 
barriers that they faced as a consequence of their Internment-era 
convictions. On the majority view, then, they had no business 
coming to court and demanding review of their old cases. 
This Article will critique the majority approach to coram nobis, 
which demands that the petitioner prove an ongoing “civil 
disability” before a court will review the conviction. The civil 
disabilities test employed by the majority of circuit courts denies 
individuals and society the benefits of “setting the record straight” 
and thus cripples an important mechanism for systemic self-
correction. As the Japanese internment cases demonstrate, coram 
 
 8. See United States v. Hernandez, 94 F.3d 606, 613 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing 
United States v. Bruno, 903 F.2d 393, 396 (5th Cir.1990)) (noting requirement of “civil 
disabilities”); Hager v. United States, 993 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1993) (requiring continued 
suffering of “significant collateral consequences from the judgment”); United States v. 
Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 996 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring a demonstration “that [petitioner] is 
suffering civil disabilities as a consequence of the criminal conviction”); Nicks v. United States, 
955 F.2d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 1992) (deeming the writ appropriate where “subsequent 
disabilities” or “legal consequences” persist); United States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653, 658 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (emphasizing the need to show “lingering civil disabilities” from a wrongful 
conviction); United States v. Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The petitioner 
must show that he is suffering from continuing consequences of the allegedly invalid 
conviction.”); Stewart v. United States, 446 F.2d 42, 43–44 (8th Cir. 1971) (requiring 
“present” or “continuing adverse consequences”). But see United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 
1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming a grant of the writ without considering continuing 
harm to the petitioners). 
 9. See generally Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–39 (2006). 
 10. Richard Goldstein, Fred Korematsu, 86, Dies; Lost Key Suit on Internment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at C13, available at 2005 WLNR 5085604. 
 11. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 592. 
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nobis serves a necessary function for both personal vindication and 
social rehabilitation.12 But it can do so only if the courts follow the 
Ninth Circuit approach and jettison the civil disabilities test. In this 
Article, I argue that unlawfully convicted petitioners should not be 
denied coram nobis relief simply because they cannot prove an 
ongoing civil disability; rather, these petitioners should receive relief 
whenever they can show that their conviction was unlawful. 
A properly functioning writ of coram nobis will become even 
more vital in the coming years due to a combination of technological 
advances and social changes. Information technology makes criminal 
records instantly and easily accessible to anyone with an Internet 
connection, and thus practically precludes escape from the stigma of 
criminal conviction.13 At the same time, forensic technology is 
becoming more powerful and cheaper and will allow more people 
the chance to challenge the factual basis for their convictions long 
after trial.14 Additionally, information-savvy citizens increasingly 
understand that one’s reputation needs to be guarded, in the 
physical world as well as online. Together, these trends are likely to 
lead to an increase in meritorious attacks on old convictions, both in 
habeas and coram nobis, and the court system will need to respond 
in a fair and practical way. As the number of petitions for coram 
nobis begins to rise, the flaws of the civil disabilities test will be cast 
in stark relief, and the circuit split over the issue ought to attract the 
attention of the Supreme Court. I argue that the Court should 
resolve the split decisively in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s minority 
approach and rid coram nobis of this impediment to remedial 
justice.15 
 
 12. Indeed, in the extraordinary cases of Korematsu and Hirabayashi, coram nobis also 
allowed for national reconciliation and proof of America’s capacity to recognize its errors and 
correct them. 
 13. See infra Part V.B. 
 14. See, e.g., Fredrick R. Bieber, Science and Technology of Forensic DNA Profiling: 
Current Use and Future Directions, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23–24 
(David Lazer ed., 2004); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 
1659 (2008) (“Assuming that genetic science and technology continue to improve, innocence 
claims will continue to be important, particularly as the cost of testing falls and the speed of 
testing increases.”); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 
2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 528 (2005) (finding that the rate of exonerations 
nationwide climbed sharply between 1989 and 2003 due in part to “the growing availability 
and sophistication of DNA identification technology”). 
 15. The Supreme Court’s current attitude toward coram nobis is difficult to read. The 
Court recently affirmed the jurisdiction of Article I military courts to entertain coram nobis 
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In Part III of this Article, I briefly review the development of the 
writ of coram nobis from its Medieval origins to its contemporary 
function in federal criminal procedure. I also detail how the promise 
of the contemporary writ of coram nobis was strangled in the 
overwhelming majority of federal circuits due to the emergence of 
the civil disabilities test in the late 1980s. 
In Part IV, I argue that the creation of the civil disabilities test 
relied on a misreading of two relevant legal sources—namely, the 
landmark Supreme Court case of Morgan v. United States16 and the 
federal habeas statute of 1948.17 Neither the Morgan case nor the 
federal habeas statute suggested the development of the restrictive 
civil disabilities test; rather, those sources support a more expansive 
view of collateral review in the federal courts. 
In Part V, I contend that the civil disabilities test overlooks the 
severity of the non-legal results of conviction. In particular, I argue 
that the reputational and professional consequences of unlawful 
conviction require redress on their own and that righting 
reputational wrongs is a long-established function of the judicial 
system. 
Finally, in Part VI, I analyze the core clash between the values of 
accuracy and finality that underlies and animates the debate over the 
civil disabilities test. I argue that the civil disabilities test constitutes a 
serious deviation from the norm of accuracy without any significant 
countervailing gain in finality or judicial economy. The judicial 
system would not be over-burdened by a “flood” of coram nobis 
cases in the absence of the civil disabilities test. Coram nobis already 
requires a threshold showing that valid reasons exist for failing to 
challenge the conviction earlier; district courts can thus deny, 
without hearing, redundant and abusive coram nobis petitions. 
The sum of my argument is this: no court, presented with 
incontrovertible evidence of an unlawful conviction, should dismiss a 
coram nobis petition on the grounds that the petitioner does not 
suffer from an ongoing civil disability. Being branded a convicted 
 
petitions, United States v. Denedo, 129 S. Ct. 2213 (2009), and in doing so, confirmed the 
vitality of coram nobis as a “tool” to correct legal and factual errors in otherwise final 
convictions. Id. at 2221. At the same time, the Court stressed that coram nobis is an 
“‘extraordinary remedy’” that “‘should not be granted in the ordinary case.’” Id. at 2224 
(quoting Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1762 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 16. 346 U.S. 502 (1954). 
 17. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Rules of Decisions Act, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 
Stat. 869 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006)). 
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criminal is, in virtually every case, a significant reputational and 
professional injury, and it is never too late for the judicial system to 
correct its errors, set the record straight, and vacate unlawful and 
erroneous convictions. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL CORAM NOBIS 
A. The Writ at Common Law 
Coram nobis has a long history in the common law, stretching 
back to sixteenth-century England.18 Created at a time when 
appellate review of criminal judgments was generally unavailable and 
when court cases conclusively ended at the end of a defined term, 
traditional coram nobis provided a narrow opportunity for a court to 
reconsider a final judgment that it had rendered in a previous judicial 
term.19 The traditional writ was available primarily to address the 
problem of new facts coming to light—facts that were unavailable to 
the petitioner and unconsidered by the court in the earlier case.20 
Application of the traditional writ did not depend on whether or not 
the petitioner was in custody and, in fact, did not depend on 
whether the case was criminal or civil.21 Common-law courts 
developed the writ of coram nobis for certain extraordinary 
circumstances where equity appeared to require review of an 
otherwise final or non-appealable judgment.22 
The traditional writ of coram nobis migrated to the United 
States along with the common law, appearing in both state and 
federal courts and in both civil and criminal matters.23 In the federal 
courts, coram nobis maintained its traditional function as a means for 
trial courts to correct factual errors in previously decided cases from 
 
 18. See Daniel F. Piar, Using Coram Nobis to Attack Wrongful Convictions: A New Look 
at an Ancient Writ, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 505, 506–07 (2003); M. Diane Duszak, Note, Post-
McNally Review of Invalid Convictions Through the Writ of Coram Nobis, 58 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 979, 981–82 (1990). 
 19. See United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing the 
historical origins of the coram nobis writ). 
 20. See id.; Piar, supra note 18, at 506–07; Duszak, supra note 18, at 981–82. 
 21. See Duszak, supra note 18, at 981. 
 22. See sources cited supra note 18. Other such extraordinary writs included audita 
querela, certiorari, coram vobis, and habeas corpus. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 126, 220, 
338, 715 (7th ed. 1999). 
 23. See Piar, supra note 18, at 509–29; Duszak supra note 18, at 982. 
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earlier judicial terms.24 As courts crafted other mechanisms for 
correcting factual and clerical mistakes, the issuance of coram nobis 
became more and more rare, until the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, originally issued in 1937, explicitly abolished the writ in 
civil actions.25 The availability of coram nobis in criminal cases 
remained a subject of some confusion in the ensuing years, and 
neither the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
in 1946 nor the adoption of federal “statutory habeas” in 1948 
cleared up the matter.26 The use of coram nobis in federal courts had 
all but died out until the Supreme Court resurrected and refashioned 
the writ in the landmark case of United States v. Morgan.27 
B. United States v. Morgan: The Refashioning of Coram Nobis 
In 1939, Robert Patrick Morgan pled guilty to eight federal 
criminal counts related to the theft of three pieces of mail from the 
U.S. Postal Service.28 He was nineteen years old, did not retain 
counsel, and apparently never waived his right to retain counsel.29 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York 
sentenced Morgan to four years in prison.30 Eleven years later, in 
1950, Morgan was convicted of attempted burglary in a New York 
state court, and, pursuant to New York’s Multiple Offenders Law, 
the state court sentenced Morgan to a longer term than it otherwise 
would have on account of the previous federal conviction.31 Facing a 
longer state sentence, Morgan filed a motion for a writ of coram 
nobis in the U.S. District for the Northern District of New York 
seeking to vacate his federal conviction of 1939, which formed the 
basis for his extended state sentence.32 
The federal court thus squarely faced the question of whether the 
writ of coram nobis was available in federal criminal cases at all, and 
 
 24. See Piar, supra note 18, at 511–12. 
 25. FED. R. CIV. P. 60(e). 
 26. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 517–19 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
abolished the writ of coram nobis in criminal cases). 
 27. 346 U.S. 502 (1954). 
 28. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67, 67 (2d Cir. 1953), aff’d, 346 U.S. 502 
(1954). 
 29. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 511. 
 30. Id. at 503. 
 31. Id. at 503–04. 
 32. Id. at 504. 
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if so, whether Morgan’s circumstances qualified. The district court 
tried to side-step the issue by treating Morgan’s motion as one for 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the federal habeas statute.33 It thus 
denied the motion, reasoning that it did not have jurisdiction 
because Morgan was no longer “in custody” as required by § 2255.34 
The Second Circuit, however, insisted that coram nobis would be 
proper “[i]f Morgan can establish that he was deprived of his 
common law right to be represented by counsel.”35 
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals judgment, 
concluding that federal courts have the power to grant motions “in 
the nature of the extraordinary writ of coram nobis.”36 Writing that 
“[i]n behalf of the unfortunates, federal courts should act in doing 
justice if the record makes plain a right to relief,”37 the five-justice 
majority revitalized the ancient writ and placed it on a firm footing. 
The Court conceded “a difference of opinion as to the 
availability of the remedy” among the lower federal courts38 and 
noted that “coram nobis is not specifically authorized by any statute 
enacted by Congress.”39 Indeed, the writ had been abolished in civil 
cases by Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.40 
Tracing its long history in common law,41 however, the Court found 
sufficient statutory authority for the “ancient writ of coram nobis” in 
the All Writs Act of 1789, which authorizes federal courts to “issue 
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”42 
Writing for the majority, Justice Reed forcefully rejected the 
dissent’s position that promulgation of § 2255 superseded any 
remedy in the nature of coram nobis in federal courts.43 The majority 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. Morgan was serving his state sentence at the time that he filed his coram nobis 
claim, but the “in custody” requirement of § 2255 refers only to federal custody. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006); United States v. Lavelle, 194 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1952). 
 35. United States v. Morgan, 202 F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1953), aff’d, 346 U.S. 502 
(1954). 
 36. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512–13. 
 37. Id. at 505. 
 38. Id. at 509. 
 39. Id. at 506. 
 40. Id. at 505 n.4. 
 41. Id. at 507–08. 
 42. Id. at 506 & n.6 (quoting All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). 
 43. Id. at 510–11. 
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explained that the purpose of § 2255 was “‘to meet practical 
difficulties’ in the administration of federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction,” not to “cover the entire field of remedies in the nature 
of coram nobis.”44 Reiterating that “[n]owhere in the history of  
§ 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights to 
collateral attack upon their convictions,” the Court concluded, “We 
do not think that the enactment of § 2255 is a bar to this [coram 
nobis] motion.”45 
The Court went on to sketch out the circumstances under which 
the writ may be available. Coram nobis relief “should be allowed . . . 
only under circumstances compelling such action to achieve 
justice”—namely, (a) curing of “errors ‘of the most fundamental 
character’” when (b) “no other remedy [is] then available” and (c) 
“sound reasons [exist] for failure to seek appropriate earlier relief.”46 
The key move in United States v. Morgan was the Court’s 
holding that the violation of Morgan’s right to counsel constituted 
an error of the most fundamental character.47 This holding 
transformed coram nobis from its traditional function as a means for 
curing factual errors, unknown to the trial court, to a new function 
of curing any error of “the most fundamental character,” including 
legal error. The majority did not even attempt to argue that the basis 
for Morgan’s motion was an alleged error in fact, unknown to the 
sentencing judge.48 Rather, the Court ignored that issue entirely and, 
relying on language from United States v. Mayer, held that coram 
nobis may be applied to cure “fundamental errors.”49 By focusing on 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 511. 
 46. Id. at 511–12. The Court explained how Morgan’s case fit the first two conditions it 
laid out: the denial of Morgan’s right to counsel constituted the fundamental error of his state 
conviction, and no other remedy for that error was currently available. Id. However, the Court 
did not explain what “sound reasons” Morgan may have had for not seeking appropriate relief 
earlier, e.g., on direct appeal or in the form of a habeas motion. After all, the constitutional 
right to counsel, to which Morgan appealed, was available as a ground for habeas relief at least 
since Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), a case decided before Morgan’s 1939 conviction 
in federal district court. 
 47. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512 (“[A] federal trial without competent and intelligent 
waiver of counsel bars a conviction of the accused.”). 
 48. The dissent took the majority to task for its novel interpretation of what constitutes 
fundamental error in coram nobis. “The sentencing court must have known that respondent 
did not have an attorney and was not advised of his right to counsel, if such are the facts. What 
then was it that the court didn’t know which if it had known would probably have produced a 
different result?” Id. at 516 (Minton, J., dissenting). 
 49.  Id. at 512 (majority opinion) (“In the Mayer case, this Court said that coram nobis 
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the phrase “errors of the most fundamental character” and ignoring 
the phrase “errors of fact,”50 the Court not only rescued coram nobis 
from legal “limbo,”51 but also revitalized the writ by creating a new 
function for it. Rather than an obscure writ only good for correcting 
factual errors, coram nobis became a collateral remedy available in 
federal court to correct fundamental legal errors when alternative 
avenues of relief are unavailable. Moreover, while the Court limited 
its applicability to cases in which habeas relief was unavailable, by 
dubbing a petition for coram nobis as “of the same general character 
as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,”52 the Court effectively created a 
companion writ to habeas corpus. Coram nobis became, in essence, 
habeas for those not in federal custody. 
The greatest point of contention between the majority and the 
minority—which still sets the terms of debate surrounding coram 
nobis today—is the proper weight assigned to the values of accuracy 
and finality. The majority held that coram nobis should be available 
only in extraordinary cases, but that finality must bow to accuracy 
where the “record makes plain a right to relief.”53 “Otherwise,” 
wrote Justice Reed, “a wrong may stand uncorrected which the 
available remedy would right.”54 The majority noted that the 
“wrong” of an unlawful conviction is not only an abstract injustice in 
the system, but also that “the results of the conviction may persist” 
for the convicted person himself.55 “Subsequent convictions may 
carry heavier penalties,” the Court wrote; “civil rights may be 
affected.”56 In other words, unlawfully convicted people may suffer 
ongoing harm from their unlawful convictions; the effects of a past 
conviction may persist to the present. 
 
included errors ‘of the most fundamental character.’”) (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 
U.S. 55, 69 (1914)). 
 50. In context, the Mayer Court’s “most fundamental character” language itself referred 
to “errors of fact . . . where the errors were of the most fundamental character, that is, such as 
rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid.” Mayer, 235 U.S. at 69. 
 51. See Morgan, 346 U.S. at 513 (Minton, J., dissenting) (“I am unable to agree with 
the decision of the Court resurrecting the ancient writ of error coram nobis from the limbo to 
which it presumably had been relegated . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 52. Id. at 506 n.4 (majority opinion). 
 53. Id. at 505. 
 54. Id. at 512. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 512–13. 
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The minority was also sensitive to the clash between accuracy 
and finality: “The important principle that means for redressing 
deprivations of constitutional rights should be available often clashes 
with the also important principle that at some point a judgment 
should become final—that litigation must eventually come to an 
end.”57 According to the minority, federal courts “traditionally”—
and Congress statutorily via § 2255—have drawn the line “by 
permitting collateral attacks on judgment only during the time that 
punishment under the judgment is being imposed.”58 In other 
words, the law allows for collateral review only during incarceration. 
The dissent recognized that “the record of a conviction for a serious 
crime is often a lifelong handicap,”59 but rejected the proposition 
that relief should be available for an unlawful conviction throughout 
the wronged party’s lifetime. Coram nobis should not be available, 
argued the dissent, if a person is merely suffering “a stain on his 
reputation.”60 As for those who, like Morgan, “have returned to 
crime and want the record expunged to lessen a subsequent 
sentence,” the minority found such relief “unwarranted.”61 In sum, 
the minority argued that there are no cases in which collateral relief is 
due to an ex-convict who has already served his or her time. “If that 
is to be changed,” the dissent concluded, “Congress should do it.”62 
The dissent’s basic argument—that traditional coram nobis 
would not extend to cases such as Morgan’s—was formidable as far 
as it went. But the majority opinion succeeded in filling a gap in 
post-conviction relief and in firmly anchoring the newly revitalized 
writ of coram nobis in the All Writs Act and in Supreme Court 
precedent.63 Morgan was an appropriate response to an untenable 
 
 57. Id. at 519–20 (Minton, J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 520. 
 59. Id. at 519. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 520. 
 63. The D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have both explicitly referred to Morgan as 
an exercise in gap-filling. See United States v. Valdez-Pacheco, 237 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“Morgan stands for the proposition that the common law writs, such as coram nobis 
and audita querela, are available to fill the interstices of the federal post-conviction remedial 
framework.” (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 428 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (“The teaching of Morgan is that federal courts may properly fill the interstices of 
the federal postconviction remedial framework through remedies available at common law.”); 
see also Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs and Federal Common Lawmaking on 
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situation—that is, the absolute unavailability of relief to a person not 
in custody who stands convicted of a crime despite errors “of 
fundamental character” in the conviction.64 The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Morgan correctly signaled that the American justice 
system would not ignore manifestly unlawful convictions as a matter 
of course. 
Morgan marked a dramatic point in the history of coram nobis. 
Before Morgan, coram nobis was dying in the federal courts. After 
Morgan, coram nobis became a vital part of the post-conviction legal 
landscape. Before Morgan, coram nobis was primarily a writ for the 
correction of factual errors, errors that were unknown (and 
unknowable) to the convicting court. After Morgan, coram nobis 
became a writ available to correct any error “of the most 
fundamental character,” including constitutional and other legal 
defects, in the original conviction. 
C. Post-Morgan Coram Nobis and Federal Collateral Review 
After Morgan, it was not immediately obvious which legal errors 
would be deemed “fundamental” enough to merit relief by coram 
nobis, but the trend has been clear: the same errors that are deemed 
grounds for § 2255 habeas relief give rise to coram nobis relief.65 In 
United States v. Doe, for example, the Seventh Circuit wrote that a 
coram nobis petitioner must allege an error in the underlying 
conviction that is “the type of defect that would have justified habeas 
corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.”66 The Sixth Circuit has 
noted that “the standards for granting relief under a writ of error 
coram nobis and under a § 2255 motion are substantially the 
 
Collateral Review, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1495 (2002) (arguing that federal courts have a 
legitimate “interstitial, gap-filling role” in collateral review). 
 64. In his treatise on post-conviction procedure, Professor Yackle wrote, “In a real 
sense, coram nobis for federal petitioners, like habeas corpus for state prisoners, is a remedy of 
convenience—developed by judicial decision to do service in meritorious cases.” LARRY W. 
YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 36 (Publisher’s Editorial Staff et al. eds., 2008) 
(Supp. 2008). 
 65. This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement in Morgan that a motion for 
coram nobis is “of the same general character as one under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” 346 U.S. 502, 
506 n.4 (1954). See also YACKLE, supra note 64 (“The lower courts have . . . assumed that 
coram nobis is available to raise any claim cognizable under section 2255.”). 
 66. 867 F.2d 986, 988 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Strauss v. United States, 516 F.2d 980, 
985 n.9 (7th Cir. 1975) (“It is insignificant that the writ in Travers was one for coram nobis, 
rather than habeas corpus.”). 
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same.”67 And the Eighth Circuit has held that “[t]he two remedies 
are . . . substantially equivalent.”68 
A comprehensive catalogue of all errors deemed sufficient to 
trigger § 2255 relief and, thus, coram nobis relief, is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but there are essentially two broad types of 
claims that appear repeatedly in collateral review cases. The first is a 
claim that new facts have emerged showing a “fundamental error” in 
the underlying conviction. The second is a claim that, after the final 
disposition of the case, the Supreme Court or the court of appeals 
substantively narrowed the interpretation of the relevant criminal 
statute so as to decriminalize the actions for which the defendant was 
convicted. Upon collateral review, the question becomes whether the 
reviewing court will apply the interpretation of the statute at the date 
of conviction or at the date of the collateral review. 
This question turns on the tricky area of retroactivity 
jurisprudence, but the answer has been clear since the Supreme 
Court decided the case of Davis v. United States in 1974.69 In Davis, 
the Court held that the interpretation of the criminal law at the time 
of collateral review, not the interpretation at the time of conviction, 
would govern.70 As the Court stated emphatically, “conviction and 
punishment . . . for an act that the law does not make criminal . . . 
results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”71 Thus, collateral relief is 
appropriate in those circumstances when a subsequent interpretation 
of a criminal statute has decriminalized the predicate conduct.72 And 
while many aspects of the Supreme Court’s retroactivity 
 
 67. Pitts v. United States, 763 F.2d 197, 199 n.1 (6th Cir. 1985). 
 68. United States v. Little, 608 F.2d 296, 299 (8th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. 
Travers, 514 F.2d 1171, 1173 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974) (explaining that the standards applied in 
federal coram nobis are “similar” to those in § 2255 cases). But see United States v. Stoneman, 
870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989). Although the Third Circuit has suggested that the 
standards for obtaining relief in coram nobis cases are “even more stringent” than the 
standards for habeas relief, it has never identified a type of legal error that would elicit habeas 
relief but not coram nobis relief. Id. In other words, there is no identifiable class of error that is 
“fundamental” enough to warrant habeas corpus relief but not fundamental enough to warrant 
coram nobis relief. 
 69. 417 U.S. 333 (1974). 
 70. Id. at 346–47. 
 71. Id. at 346 (internal quotations omitted). 
 72. Davis also makes clear that the change in interpretation need not come from the 
U.S. Supreme Court. It was the Ninth Circuit and not the Supreme Court that narrowed its 
interpretation of the statute under which Davis was convicted. Id. at 339–40. And it was the 
new Ninth Circuit law—i.e., the law of the Ninth Circuit at the time of collateral review—that 
the Supreme Court held should govern Davis’s § 2255 motion. Id. at 346. 
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jurisprudence have changed dramatically since 1974,73 the Court has 
not changed its view on the question presented in Davis. The 
Court’s 2004 opinion in Schriro v. Summerlin confirmed that post-
conviction decisions creating new substantive rules of law generally 
apply retroactively on collateral review.74 “This includes,” wrote the 
Court, “decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by 
interpreting its terms as well as constitutional determinations that 
place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond 
the State’s power to punish.”75 
The Second Circuit explicitly extended the retroactivity holding 
of Davis to cover petitions for coram nobis in the case of United 
States v. Travers.76 In Travers, a man who had already served his 
sentence for federal mail fraud brought a petition for a writ of coram 
nobis, claiming that a Supreme Court opinion post-dating his release 
from prison now made his conviction invalid.77 The government 
argued that the subsequent case should not be given retroactive 
effect,78 but the court of appeals cited Davis for the proposition that 
“fundamental notions of fairness” require that the court apply the 
most recent interpretation of a criminal statute.79 And the court 
noted that, “[a]lthough the Davis case arose under 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2255, the standards applied in federal coram nobis are similar.”80 
Thus, because “Travers was convicted and punished ‘for an act that 
the law does not make criminal,’” he “is entitled to relief.”81 
 
 73. See generally Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane 
Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the 
Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161 (2005). 
 74. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004). 
 75. Id. (citations omitted). The Court reiterated the rationale for the retroactivity of 
new substantive rules as follows: “Such rules apply retroactively because they ‘necessarily carry 
a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of “an act that the law does not make 
criminal”’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Id. (quoting Bousley 
v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)). 
 76. 514 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 77. Id. at 1172. 
 78. Id. at 1173. 
 79. Id. at 1175–76. 
 80. Id. at 1173 n.1. The court did admit that “Davis depended to some extent on a 
parsing of the ambiguous language of § 2255,” but still held that the standards for § 2255 and 
coram nobis are interchangeable in this area. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1176. In finding for Travers, the Second Circuit noted “‘the familiar principle 
that res judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings,’” Id. at 1175 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391, 423 (1963)), and that it could “see no reason why this same principle should not be 
applicable in coram nobis.” Id. The Travers Court expressly limited its decision to petitioners 
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Travers is the natural product of Morgan and Davis. Morgan 
resuscitated coram nobis as the functional analog to § 2255 relief for 
those not in custody, and Davis held that § 2255 relief is available to 
those convicted for behavior that the law, according to the latest 
authoritative cases, does not make criminal. Therefore, coram nobis 
is available to those who were convicted for behavior that the law 
does not (or does not any longer) criminalize. The conclusion makes 
sense both as a logical doctrinal outcome and as a necessary function 
of the justice system. After Travers, the inequities caused by gaps in  
§ 2255—that is, the lack of a remedy for illegally convicted 
individuals not in custody—would appear to have been filled. 
Through the refashioning of an obscure and ancient writ, and the 
evolution of that old-new writ in tandem with the Great Writ of 
habeas corpus, federal courts saw to it that convictions for “phantom 
crimes” would no longer go uncorrected. 
D. The Emergence of the Civil Disabilities Test 
By the mid-1970s, then, it appeared that coram nobis 
represented a viable means for collateral review, equivalent in scope 
to habeas corpus, for convicted persons out of custody. But the story 
does not end with Travers, for although it remains good law, a new 
controversy erupted in the field of coram nobis in the late 1980s. 
The controversy concerned what kind of harm (if any) a coram nobis 
petitioner must show as a threshold matter in order to attain a 
hearing on his or her petition. 
The baseline requirements for coram nobis set by the Supreme 
Court in Morgan did not speak explicitly to the issue of a threshold 
showing of harm. The Court had properly presumed that Morgan 
had a sufficient stake in the outcome of his petition to meet the 
requirements of standing, and the Court did not demand any 
 
“like Travers, [who] fully pursued their appellate remedies”—that is, petitioners who had 
directly appealed their convictions. Id. at 1176. The Court left to “another day the 
determination of the proper result when less has been done.” Id. at 1177. 
That day came in 1976 when the Second Circuit decided the case of United States v. 
Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1976). In Loschiavo, the court ruled affirmatively that 
collateral relief is due when a subsequent decision decriminalizes the conduct underlying an 
earlier conviction, even if the defendant did not pursue available appellate remedies. Id. at 665. 
The court wrote that if it let stand a conviction for behavior that the statute did not 
criminalize, then “the frustration and defeat of justice would be glaringly apparent to the most 
myopic and obtuse.” Id. at 667. 
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further, special showing of harm.82 So the Court did not explicitly 
say whether some threshold showing of harm, traceable to the 
underlying conviction, was necessary to bring a coram nobis petition. 
The question, then, emerged: must a petitioner for coram nobis 
prove to the court that he or she is actually suffering an ongoing 
collateral consequence of conviction, and if so, what kind of 
collateral consequences qualify? In response to this question, the 
Seventh Circuit developed the civil disabilities test,83 and the 
majority of circuits followed suit.84 
The development of the civil disabilities test begins with a case 
that itself had nothing to do with coram nobis, McNally v. United 
States.85 Prior to McNally, many convictions of public officials for 
mail fraud relied on the so-called “intangible right” theory of the 
crime, which held that the federal mail fraud statute protected the 
intangible right of the citizenry to have public officials perform their 
duties honestly.86 In McNally, the Supreme Court rejected the 
“intangible right” theory of mail fraud and interpreted the mail fraud 
statute to protect only property rights, not an intangible right of the 
citizens to good government.87 As a consequence, a number of 
people convicted of mail fraud under the old “intangible right” 
theory—among them, many former politicians—brought coram 
nobis petitions to vacate their convictions. 
 
 82. Indeed, it would have been odd if the Court had dwelt on the question of whether 
Morgan had a sufficient stake in the litigation, for the extended length of his state sentence was 
based on his federal felony conviction. Thus, vacating his federal felony conviction would 
almost certainly lessen his state sentence. 
 83. United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 84. See United States v. Hernandez, 94 F.3d 606, 613 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996); Hager v. 
United States, 993 F.2d 4, 5 (1st Cir. 1993); Nicks v. United States, 955 F.2d 161, 167 (2d 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Drobny, 955 F.2d 990, 996 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Stoneman, 870 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Stewart v. United States, 446 F.2d 42, 
43–44 (8th Cir. 1971) (remanding to district court to determine whether petitioner “is 
suffering from present adverse consequences” sufficient to justify remedy). But see United 
States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming grant of coram nobis 
because “petitioners . . . would face the remainder of their lives branded as criminals”). 
 85. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 86. Id. at 355. 
 87. Id. at 356. The key text of the mail fraud statute at the time of McNally criminalized 
use of the mails to execute “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Id. at 352 
n.1. 
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The first of the McNally cases to reach the Seventh Circuit was 
United States v. Keane,88 in which a former Chicago city councilman 
argued that his 1974 indictment for mail fraud should be vacated 
because it relied on the discredited “intangible right” theory.89 The 
Seventh Circuit conceded that “McNally knocked out the 
prosecution’s principal theory in Keane’s case.”90 But the court 
refused to grant relief because it held that Keane was not entitled to 
“a fresh adjudication” of his case.91 
Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court, began his analysis of 
Keane’s petition by asserting that “[t]he norm of finality, with an 
exception while custody or another deprivation of liberty continues, 
is the background for understanding the writ of error coram 
nobis.”92 Thus, even if “§ 2255 permits relitigation if the defendant 
is in custody and there is an intervening change of law[,] . . . [t]he 
reason to bend the usual rules of finality is missing when liberty is 
not at stake.”93 This line of reasoning echoed the Morgan dissent and 
called into question the very raison d’etre of coram nobis—that is, to 
provide collateral relief to they who are no longer in federal custody. 
But the Seventh Circuit could not, of course, overturn Morgan. 
Instead, Judge Easterbrook’s emphasis on the value of finality served 
as a rhetorical prelude to the next step in the opinion. Those 
pursuing coram nobis, he wrote, “must demonstrate that the 
judgment of conviction produces lingering civil disabilities (collateral 
consequences).”94 Moreover, these civil disabilities must be “unique 
to criminal convictions.”95 Such disabilities, according to 
Easterbrook, “include loss of the rights to vote, hold occupational 
licenses (including law licenses), and bear arms.”96 But the court 
made clear that it would strictly construe this list, and it rejected 
financial penalties (fines) and reputational injury as civil disabilities 
 
 88. 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 89. Id. at 200. The underlying indictment led to a sentence of two years imprisonment 
and a fine of $27,000. Id. 
 90. Id. at 205. 
 91. Id. at 202. 
 92. Id. This is a strange way to introduce a writ whose function is precisely to allow “an 
exception” to the norm of finality in cases other than those involving custody. 
 93. Id. at 203 (citations omitted). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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because, it noted, “[c]ivil judgments frequently have the same 
effects.”97 
The court conceded that Keane’s conviction constituted “a black 
mark” on his record.98 But, the court continued, a reputational black 
mark “is not a civil disability . . . . [A]nd a blot on one’s escutcheon, 
divorced from any particular entitlement to a ‘clean record,’ does not 
even involve a liberty interest.”99 Keane should not be able to 
“obtain coram nobis just to bask in the satisfaction of having his 
position vindicated.”100 In a closing flourish, Judge Easterbrook 
wrote the following: 
[W]e live in a world of scarcity, one in which that most inflexible 
commodity, time itself, sets a limit on our ability to prevent and 
correct mistakes. Every legal system tolerates a risk of error. It tries 
to find procedures that will hold error to a minimum, but then it 
must move on. Bygones are beyond recall.101 
The court thus held that Keane’s petition could be dismissed 
without hearing, for he suffered no ongoing legal consequence as a 
result of his conviction.102 
Judge Easterbrook expanded his views on coram nobis the next 
year in United States v. Bush.103 In Bush, Judge Easterbrook noted 
that “[h]istory limits the writ [of coram nobis] to factual questions 
that have not been litigated before.”104 Therefore, the court 
reasoned, “to the extent the contemporary writ goes further, the 
principles underlying the ‘custody’ requirement of § 2255 call for 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 204. 
 99. Id. (citations omitted). 
 100. Id. As for the fact that Keane was assessed and paid a fine of $27,000, Judge 
Easterbrook agreed that the fine gave Keane “a stake sufficient to produce a ‘case or 
controversy.’” Id. But, he went on, “the fine is no different from the award of damages in civil 
litigation. It is a sunk cost rather than a continuing disability producing additional injury as 
time passes.” Id. This bit of reasoning reveals a couple of points. First, the Keane court 
expressly created an obstacle to coram nobis relief substantially higher than Article III 
standing. Second, by rejecting the payment of a $27,000 fine as an adequate basis for redress, 
the court arrogated for itself the power to determine what is and is not a “continuing 
disability” of conviction. Surely a loss of money in the past constitutes a continuing disability in 
the present, insofar as one is worse off now without it. 
 101. Id. at 206. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 888 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 104. Id. at 1146. 
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some ongoing legal disability as a custody-substitute.”105 The right 
substitute, according to Judge Easterbrook, was a showing by the 
petitioner that he was “suffering civil disabilities unique to criminal 
convictions” at the time of the coram nobis proceeding.106 In other 
words, Easterbrook crafted the civil disabilities test for coram nobis 
petitioners as a substitute for the custody requirement of habeas 
corpus.107 
Under the civil disabilities test, Easterbrook reasoned, the 
petitioner in Bush should be denied coram nobis relief because the 
only harm he had alleged on appeal was that “the conviction 
prevented him from holding high-visibility public relations jobs,” 
and “[d]ifficulty in obtaining a desirable job is not a legal 
disability.”108 According to Easterbrook, while the law recognizes 
some liberty interest in being able to choose one’s profession or 
occupation—for instance, nursing—liberty of occupation does not 
extend to “ranks within an occupation—head nurse versus rank-and-
file nurse, for example.”109 Because “[u]nwillingness to hire someone 
for mouth-watering jobs is not a legal disability ‘unique to criminal 
convictions,’” the court held that it was not sufficient to trigger 
coram nobis review.110 
Loss of this kind is not a satisfactory substitute for the “custody” 
requirement of § 2255 because (a) it is not a legal disability, and a 
judgment therefore may be ineffectual in redressing it, and (b) it is 
different in degree, and not in kind, from the reputational injury 
accompanying all convictions.111 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1148. 
 107. Easterbrook wrote that “reputational injury from conviction . . . does not suffice—
civil judgments, too, cause loss of money and reputation.” Id. 
 108. Id. at 1148–49. Incidentally, Easterbrook noted that, at trial, Bush had claimed that 
the record of his conviction also limited his ability to own weapons. Id. at 1148. And the 
district court held that the inability to carry a weapon did not constitute an ongoing “civil 
disability,” id., despite the fact that the Seventh Circuit in Keane had explicitly recognized the 
loss of the right to bear arms as one of the few civil disabilities unique to criminal conviction. 
United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1988). Having been rebuffed on the 
right-to-bear-arms claim at the district court level, Bush apparently abandoned it on appeal, 
and the circuit court opinion does not address the issue of whether a diminution in one’s legal 
right to own weapons as a result of a conviction is a continuing civil disability or not. 
 109. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1150 (citation omitted). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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And again, Judge Easterbrook ended his opinion with a paean to 
“the doctrines of finality that pervade the legal system.”112 “[I]n a 
costly legal system,” he wrote, “correction is a luxury. . . . Ongoing 
custody justifies relaxation [of the finality doctrine], but the duration 
of reexamination is fixed by the duration of custody.”113 
A year after Bush, the Seventh Circuit revisited coram nobis in 
United States v. Craig.114 Four defendants—three Illinois state 
legislators and a trade association lobbyist—had been convicted in 
the mid-1970s for their role in a political bribery scandal.115 All four 
were convicted under the “intangible right” theory and served their 
sentences before the Supreme Court rejected that theory in 
McNally.116 The three living individuals and the estate of the fourth 
all subsequently moved for coram nobis relief in the late 1980s.117 
The circuit court reviewed the “lingering civil disability” 
requirement first announced in Keane and expounded in Bush and 
discerned three conjunctive requirements: (1) “the disability must be 
causing a present harm; it is not enough to raise purely speculative 
harms or harms that occurred completely in the past,” (2) “the 
disability must arise out of the erroneous conviction,” and (3) “the 
potential harm to the petitioner must be more than incidental.”118 As 
an example of a situation in which all three requirements are met, the 
court offered the case of a person serving an enhanced sentence for a 
crime because of an earlier (unlawful) conviction.119 According to the 
Seventh Circuit, such a person meets all three requirements: he is 
suffering a “present harm” because he is “languishing in jail,” the 
earlier conviction is the “cause[]” of the enhancement, and an 
enhanced prison sentence is “certainly more than incidental 
harm.”120 
The petitioners in Craig did not meet the Seventh Circuit’s 
 
 112. Id. at 1151. 
 113. Id. at 1150–51. 
 114. 907 F.2d 653 (1990). This time, Judge Easterbrook was not on the panel, and 
Judge Wood wrote the opinion. 
 115. Id. at 654. 
 116. Id. at 655. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 658. The court also noted in a footnote that “if an indictment states one valid 
offense, then no coram nobis relief is available, ‘for a single felony conviction supports any civil 
disabilities.’” Id. at 658 n.2 (citation omitted). 
 119. Id. at 658. 
 120. Id. 
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threshold requirements for lingering civil disabilities.121 The court 
did not reach the merits of the deceased individual’s petition because 
it held that his estate lacked standing.122 The lawyer-lobbyist who 
was disbarred subsequent to his conviction failed the test because he 
“[had] not shown either that his conviction [was] a direct cause of 
his disbarment or that he [had] a present desire to apply for 
reinstatement to the bar.”123 Turning then to the two former 
members of the Illinois legislature who were still alive, the court 
addressed their complaint that their convictions deprived them of 
their pension benefits.124 The court accepted that their convictions 
did, in fact, cause their removal from the legislators’ pension plan, 
but held that “[a]ny harm . . . for their removal from the pension 
plan occurred entirely in the past” and therefore constituted “a sunk 
cost, much like a criminal fine.”125 The court wrote, “just as the 
possibility of recovering a fine is insufficient to justify the issuance of 
the writ, so is the possibility of recovering lost pension benefits.”126 
Finally, the court disposed of the arguments made by all of the 
petitioners that various Illinois statutes impose unique burdens on 
convicted felons, ranging from the “possibility of impeachment as a 
witness to possible ineligibility for a cigarette distributor’s permit.”127 
The court dismissed these burdens as “speculative possibilities at 
best.”128 As for the risk that petitioners would face enhanced 
sentences should they be convicted of a crime in the future, the 
court echoed the Morgan dissenters in substance and in tone: 
“Recognition of possible future criminal sentence enhancements as 
grounds for coram nobis relief would be tantamount to judicial 
recognition that the petitioners intend to commit more crimes—a 
 
 121. Id. at 660. 
 122. Id. at 657. The court held that a decedent’s estate by law “fail[s] to satisfy the 
court-imposed prudential limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. As the court put it, 
“the writ belongs to the wrongfully convicted individual and dies with that individual.” Id. 
 123. Id. at 659. According to the court, the Illinois disciplinary rules for lawyers do not 
discipline lawyers “solely for a conviction; they punish for the conduct underlying the 
conviction.” Id. Thus, even if the petitioner could show that his conduct did not constitute 
mail fraud, per McNally, the Illinois bar might still choose to keep him disbarred because of 
the underlying conduct and his “role in the scandal.” Id. 
 124. Id. at 660. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (citation omitted). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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possibility we absolutely refuse to acknowledge until it occurs.”129 In 
sum, the Seventh Circuit rejected coram nobis for all of the 
petitioners, holding that none could meet the three-part civil 
disabilities test. 
By 1991, then, the Seventh Circuit had developed a strict civil 
disabilities test, requiring a coram nobis petitioner to show an 
ongoing civil disability traceable uniquely to the conviction that she 
seeks to vacate. The Seventh Circuit view quickly became the 
dominant one in the federal courts, with the notable exception of the 
Ninth Circuit.130 
E. Hirabayashi and the Ninth Circuit’s Minority Position 
The Ninth Circuit settled on its coram nobis doctrine in the late 
1980s, just before the Seventh Circuit began developing the civil 
disabilities test. The occasion for the Ninth Circuit’s more liberal 
position was the re-opening of the landmark case of Hirabayashi v. 
United States131—part of the larger movement for recognition and 
redress for Japanese Americans interned en masse during World  
War II. The Ninth Circuit’s 1987 opinion vindicated Hirabayashi, 
vacated his two Internment-era convictions, and, as the court put it, 
made “the judgments of the courts conform to the judgments of 
history.”132 The legal mechanism by which the court vacated 
Hirabayashi’s forty-year-old convictions—the only legal mechanism 
available—was the writ of coram nobis.133 
The Supreme Court of 1943 had affirmed Hirabayashi’s 
conviction and explicitly upheld the constitutionality of the wartime 
curfew and internment orders that Hirabayashi was convicted of 
violating.134 And, despite the fact that those wartime decisions “have 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. See supra note 84. The Fourth Circuit position appears to be closer to the Ninth 
Circuit than it is to the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th 
Cir. 1988), but the Fourth Circuit has never opined in detail on the propriety of a civil 
disabilities test. Additionally, a footnote in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. 
Mandel suggests (without holding) that only felony convictions are serious enough to warrant 
coram nobis review, id. at 1075 n.12, while the Ninth Circuit has held unequivocally that 
misdemeanor convictions are also eligible for coram nobis review. Hirabayashi v. United States, 
828 F.2d 591, 606–07 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 131. 320 U.S. 81 (1943), vacated, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 132. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 593. 
 133. See id. at 604 (noting the absence of alternative relief). 
 134. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 81. 
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never occupied an honored place in our history,”135 they had never 
been overturned either. So, unlike the petitioners in the Seventh 
Circuit cases detailed above, Hirabayashi could not argue that a 
subsequent Supreme Court decision had changed the substantive law 
applicable to his earlier case. Rather, Hirabayashi’s legal strategy 
rested on the more traditional coram nobis ground that a new fact, 
unknown to the defendant and the judges during the original 
proceedings, came to light after the final conviction. The new fact, 
Hirabayashi alleged, was the discovery in 1982 of a suppressed early 
draft of a World War II–era military report.136 The long-suppressed 
draft made clear that the real rationale behind the curfew and 
exclusion orders aimed at Japanese Americans was racial prejudice 
and not military exigency.137 Thus, it undermined the factual premise 
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hirabayashi (and Korematsu) 
that “military exigency” justified a deviation from the general norm 
against race-based government action.138 
The Ninth Circuit accepted Hirabayashi’s argument that the 
suppressed draft report constituted a new fact that, if known to the 
courts at the time of original trial and appeal, would have likely 
changed the outcome of the case.139 The government argued, 
however, that the issue Hirabayashi sought to litigate was moot 
because Hirabayashi had already served his three-month sentence 
pursuant to the convictions and was suffering no current legal 
disability.140 Emphasizing that Hirabayashi’s convictions were both 
for misdemeanors, rather than felonies, the government contended 
that “ordinary misdemeanors have no ‘collateral consequences’ and 
 
 135. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 593. 
 136. Id. at 598. 
 137. Id. Known as the DeWitt Report, the early draft “declared that because of traits 
peculiar to citizens of Japanese ancestry it would be impossible to separate the loyal from the 
disloyal.” Id. The suppressed report also stated, “[i]t was not that there was insufficient time in 
which to make such a determination [separating the loyal from the disloyal]; it was simply a 
matter of facing the realities that a positive determination could not be made, that an exact 
separation of the ‘sheep from the goats’ was unfeasible.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 138. Id. at 599. 
 139. Id. at 603–04. 
 140. Id. at 605. The government did not dispute that the Internment-era convictions 
were “part of an unfortunate episode in our nation’s history,” but vigorously objected to the 
grant of coram nobis relief. Id. at 597 n.9. The government asked that the convictions be 
vacated via Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48, which permits termination of prosecution 
and dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 607. After losing in the Ninth Circuit, the government 
did not petition for certiorari. 
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therefore are not subject to post-conviction attack absent some 
special legal disability.”141 In other words, the government asked the 
Ninth Circuit to adopt a civil disabilities test for coram nobis 
petitions. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the government’s 
argument that the petition was moot and expressly rejected the idea 
that some special disability is required to attain coram nobis.142 The 
court started from the premise that the petitioner need only show 
that “adverse consequences exist from the conviction sufficient to 
satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III.”143 Then, 
relying on the Supreme Court case of Sibron v. New York,144 the 
court of appeals held that there is a “presumption that collateral 
consequences flow from any criminal conviction.”145 Rather than 
placing the burden on the petitioner to show some “special legal 
disability,”146 as the Seventh Circuit would later do, the Ninth 
Circuit wrote that the government had the burden of showing that 
no possible collateral consequences flow from the petitioner’s 
conviction.147 The Ninth Circuit noted the “obvious fact of life that 
most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal 
consequences”148 and held that “[t]he mere ‘possibility’ that this will 
be the case is enough to preserve a criminal case from ending 
‘ignominiously in the limbo of mootness.’”149 
As for the fact that Hirabayashi’s convictions were for 
misdemeanors, rather than felonies, the court wrote, “[n]o court to 
our knowledge has ever held that misdemeanor convictions cannot 
carry collateral legal consequences. Any judgment of misconduct has 
consequences for which one may be legally or professionally 
 
 141. Id. at 605. 
 142. Id. at 606. 
 143. Id. at 604. 
 144. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
 145. Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 606. 
 146. Id. at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the government’s 
position). 
 147. See id. at 606 (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 57) (“[A] criminal case is moot only if it 
is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on 
the basis of the challenged conviction.”). 
 148. Id. (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55). 
 149. Id. (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 55). 
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accountable.”150 In sum, the Hirabayashi court had three holdings: 
(1) every criminal conviction gives rise to potential collateral 
consequences, (2) such potential is enough to establish standing for 
coram nobis, and (3) no showing of harm beyond ordinary standing 
is required to trigger coram nobis review. 
The Ninth Circuit confirmed this doctrine two years later in a 
case that exactly paralleled the Seventh Circuit cases detailed above. 
In United States v. Walgren, a former politician from Washington 
State named Gordon Walgren sought to vacate his mail fraud 
conviction on the basis of the Supreme Court’s McNally decision.151 
The Ninth Circuit agreed that “Walgren’s mail fraud conviction rests 
upon the commission of a fraud that was not a crime” and ordered 
the district court to grant coram nobis.152 Most significantly, the 
Ninth Circuit panel reiterated “‘the presumption that collateral 
consequences flow from any criminal conviction.’”153 The court 
noted that any future sentencing decisions regarding Walgren may 
take into account the total number of felonies on his record and that 
Walgren “may be impeached should he ever testify in court because 
the mail fraud conviction was based on a scheme to defraud.”154 For 
the Walgren court, these possibilities—remote as they might be—
were sufficient to grant Walgren standing to bring his petition for a 
writ of coram nobis. 
 
 150. Id. at 606–07. This last sentence is particularly significant, for it suggests that (a) the 
government can never, in practice, meet the burden of showing that there are no possible 
collateral consequences so long as the person convicted remains alive, and (b) the potential for 
adverse professional consequences alone, without “legal” consequences, is sufficient to 
generate standing for coram nobis review. In any event, the Ninth Circuit wrote, 
“Hirabayashi’s conviction was for no ordinary misdemeanor. . . . A United States citizen who is 
convicted of a crime on account of race is lastingly aggrieved.” Id. at 607. 
 151. 885 F.2d 1417, 1419–20 (9th Cir. 1989). Gordon Walgren was the former Senate 
Majority Leader of the Washington State Legislature, and he had been convicted of mail fraud, 
RICO, and Travel Act violations after a long FBI investigation into gambling and political 
corruption in Washington State. Id. at 1419. The so-called Gamscam scandal led to the 
resignation and, ultimately, the conviction of both Senate Majority Leader Walgren and the 
Washington State Speaker of the House, John Bagnariol. Both men were accused of conspiring 
with California mobsters (in fact, undercover FBI agents) to help legalize certain kinds of 
gambling in Washington State in exchange for a share of the profits. See generally Kit Oldham, 
Legislative Leaders John Bagnariol and Gordon Walgren Are Charged in Gamscam Case on 
April 2, 1980, in HISTORYLINK.ORG Essay 8515 (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www. 
historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=8515 (last visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 152. Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1424. 
 153. Id. at 1421 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 606 (9th Cir. 
1987)). 
 154. Id. at 1422. 
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Walgren signaled that the Ninth Circuit’s coram nobis doctrine 
was not limited to sympathetic litigants such as Hirabayashi, and that 
the same liberal standards would apply to litigants who requested 
coram nobis relief based on an intervening change in the 
interpretation of the statute under which they were indicted.155 The 
Ninth Circuit did not, however, grapple explicitly with the reasoning 
of the majority of circuit courts supporting the civil disabilities test. 
In its trio of opinions developing the civil disabilities test, the 
Seventh Circuit offered a number of legal and policy arguments in its 
defense. And while the Ninth Circuit pointed the way to a better 
doctrinal outcome, it failed to articulate a compelling counter-
argument to critique and supplant the approach championed by 
Judge Easterbrook and adopted throughout the country. For the 
remainder of this Article, I aim to offer precisely such a counter-
argument. 
IV. THE CIVIL DISABILITIES TEST AS A MISREADING OF MORGAN 
AND A MISINTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL HABEAS STATUTE 
There are three broad themes to my critique of the civil 
disabilities test. First, the civil disabilities test developed out of a 
misreading of Morgan and the federal habeas statute, § 2255. 
Second, the reputational and professional consequences of criminal 
conviction are so great that they not only satisfy doctrinal standing 
requirements but actually make it imperative to provide some form 
of redress for all those who suffer unlawful convictions. Finally, the 
use of the civil disabilities test constitutes an inexcusable departure 
from the systemic norm of accuracy while providing little in the way 
of finality and judicial economy. 
In this Part, I will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s creation of a 
civil disabilities test for coram nobis relief was not required by any 
legal source and represented a significant misunderstanding of the 
nature of coram nobis. The Seventh Circuit opinions sought textual 
support for the civil disabilities test in the language of Morgan and in 
the text of § 2255. But neither of these sources, alone or in 
combination, calls for the creation of the civil disabilities test, and a 
 
 155. In a subsequent case, United States v. McClelland, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that 
an intervening substantive change in the interpretation of a criminal statute by the court of 
appeals should also be applied retroactively to a coram nobis proceeding. 941 F.2d 999, 1001 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
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proper understanding of those sources would instead militate against 
the adoption of the test. 
A. Misreading Morgan 
The majority opinion in Morgan had very little to say about 
standing or threshold requirements for a coram nobis petition. 
Indeed, the sum total of the Court’s discussion of the adverse 
collateral consequences of conviction consisted of the following two 
sentences: “Although the term [of federal custody] has been served, 
the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may 
carry heavier penalties, civil rights may be affected.”156 Judge 
Easterbrook relied on this language to support his contention that 
“coram nobis may be employed if and only if the petitioner is 
suffering civil disabilities unique to criminal convictions.”157 But the 
two sentences from Morgan simply do not suggest the “if and only 
if” test that Judge Easterbrook created. They merely state the truism 
that criminal conviction may have adverse results aside from 
incarceration. 
The Seventh Circuit’s insistence that Morgan requires an “if and 
only if” test based on these two lines is implausible. First, even if we 
accept as a premise that the Court’s discussion of possible adverse 
consequences of conviction was a necessary part of its justification for 
recognizing coram nobis powers, then the only conclusion that 
logically follows is that coram nobis requires the possibility of adverse 
consequences, not the actuality of such consequences. But, more 
importantly, the discussion of possible adverse consequences of 
conviction was not part of the ratio decidendi of the case at all. The 
holding of the Court in Morgan is that federal courts have the 
power, pursuant to the All Writs Act, to provide relief in the form of 
coram nobis to vacate criminal convictions that are, upon proper 
showing, invalid.158 The Court reached that conclusion based on the 
history of the writ of coram nobis and its relation to modern rules of 
procedure and § 2255.159 The brief discussion of adverse 
 
 156. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512–13 (1954). 
 157. United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1988); see also id. (“When 
holding in Morgan that coram nobis may be used to avoid federal criminal convictions, the 
Supreme Court observed that the writ is valuable to bring an end to what may be substantial 
civil disabilities attached to criminal convictions.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 158. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 506–07. 
 159. Id. at 507–11. 
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consequences is better understood as a rhetorical appeal to 
remember the interests of the petitioner in relief from the collateral 
consequences of conviction. In other words, the Court did not write 
those lines to create a new barrier to coram nobis relief; rather, it 
wrote them to underscore the importance of providing collateral 
relief to convicted persons who are no longer in federal custody. 
In addition, the Court merely mentioned the “results of the 
conviction,” not results that are necessarily “unique” to criminal 
conviction, as the Seventh Circuit test requires. Judge Easterbrook 
held that monetary or reputational harm may not serve as the basis 
for coram nobis relief because such harms are not unique to a 
criminal conviction.160 But the Morgan Court did not state that only 
results unique to criminal conviction are cognizable as harms. Being 
adjudged guilty of a crime may result in a host of harms, and it is 
quite plausible that the Morgan Court saw coram nobis as a remedy 
for some or all of those harms. But there is no evidence that the 
Morgan Court meant to restrict judicial cognizance to only those 
harms that can never be experienced except by way of criminal 
conviction. 
Judge Easterbrook’s argument is that a monetary penalty (e.g., a 
fine) is not unique to criminal conviction because one may be forced 
to pay a monetary penalty if one is held liable in a civil case. But 
there is a difference between a damages award in the civil context 
and a fine in the criminal context. In the former, the payer is liable 
for some harm he or she caused to another and pays damages to 
make the other person whole. In the latter, the payer is guilty of 
breaching the criminal code and pays the fine as a punishment. Even 
in the case of civil (or administrative) penalties owed to the 
government, there is a difference between being found liable under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard for a civil violation and 
being convicted of a crime under a “no reasonable doubt” standard. 
A fine pursuant to a criminal conviction is a unique incident of 
criminal conviction; one who pays an award pursuant to a finding of 
civil liability suffers a different and lesser ignominy. 
A similar analysis pertains to reputational injury. Judge 
Easterbrook’s argument is that one may suffer negative reputational 
effects from a variety of factors, including a civil judgment or even 
 
 160. Easterbrook’s argument is that one may be forced to pay damages as a result of a 
civil (rather than criminal) judgment, and one may suffer a “black mark” on account of losing a 
civil (rather than criminal) case. See Keane, 852 F.2d at 203–04. 
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simply the exposure of embarrassing facts. He finds nothing unique 
in the reputational loss one suffers as a result of criminal conviction. 
As I will argue more fully below in Part V, this view is profoundly 
wrong; judges should—and already do—understand that criminal 
conviction brings with it a unique stigma and that a person who 
suffers a reputational injury as a result of criminal conviction suffers a 
qualitatively different kind of injury than someone injured by gossip 
or a judgment of civil liability. Just as a criminal fine is different from 
a civil award, so too is the stigma of criminal conviction different 
from the reputational harm of a civil judgment. 
B. Misinterpreting § 2255 
In Keane, Judge Easterbrook attempted to locate the 
justification for the civil disabilities test in the federal habeas statute, 
§ 2255.161 Passed in 1948, § 2255 established the procedures for 
federal courts to vacate federal criminal convictions,162 and it is 
generally considered coextensive with the traditional writ of habeas 
corpus.163 Relief pursuant to § 2255 is limited to those “in custody” 
under the terms of their conviction, and there is a long line of cases 
that establish the contours of the “custody” requirement.164 
Referring to coram nobis, Judge Easterbrook wrote, “the principles 
underlying the ‘custody’ requirement of § 2255 call for some 
ongoing legal disability as a custody-substitute.”165 The principle of  
§ 2255 demands a custody-substitute, according to Judge 
Easterbrook, in the following way: 
Because a person still “in custody” suffers a continuing deprivation, 
§ 2255 authorized collateral review for federal prisoners . . . . When 
the custody ends so does the justification for this review—not only 
the justification based on policy, but also the justification based on 
statute. . . . A court could not say that review ought to be available 
perpetually, treat the “custody” requirement of § 2255 as a 
 
 161. See id. at 203. 
 162. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006). 
 163. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427 (1962) (holding that § 2255 provides a 
remedy “exactly commensurate” with habeas corpus). 
 164. See, e.g., Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968) (holding that a prisoner serving 
consecutive sentences was “in custody” for purposes of challenging any of his convictions); 
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (holding that parole terms were sufficient to 
satisfy the “in custody” requirement of habeas). 
 165. United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1146 (7th Cir. 1989). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:21 PM 
1277 The Stigma of Conviction 
 1307 
mistake, and go ahead with collateral review under the flag of 
coram nobis whether the defendant is in custody or not. There has 
to be a substitute for the “custody” requirement.166 
It is not clear exactly what Judge Easterbrook meant to say about 
§ 2255 in the passage above. If his point was that § 2255 covers only 
convicted persons “in custody,” he is undoubtedly correct and is 
simply restating the terms of the statute. But he seemed to be 
suggesting that when Congress drafted § 2255, it started from a 
blank slate and decided, for particular policy reasons, to limit post-
conviction review only to those “in custody” while denying it to 
those no longer in custody. The policy rationale for this decision, on 
this account, was that only those still “in custody” were suffering an 
ongoing deprivation. 
Were § 2255 conceived from scratch and enacted as a 
comprehensive statute on collateral review in federal criminal cases, 
and were Judge Easterbrook able to point to compelling legislative 
history to that effect, then this account might be plausible. However, 
§ 2255 was not meant to set up a comprehensive and exclusive 
regime for all collateral review; to the contrary, it was conceived and 
enacted to solve a particular problem in the implementation of the 
common-law writ of habeas corpus.167 In particular, § 2255 vested 
jurisdiction for such review in the court that sentenced the criminal, 
rather than in the court of the jurisdiction of confinement.168 It thus 
solved the problem of certain courts, such as those located in the 
same jurisdiction as large federal prisons, receiving an unfairly large 
portion of habeas claims.169 Section 2255 did not purport to 
eviscerate the writ of coram nobis, much less provide a 
comprehensive and exclusive remedy for all post-conviction reviews. 
If there was any doubt about the scope of § 2255 with respect to 
coram nobis, the Supreme Court resolved the issue conclusively in 
Morgan when it explicitly wrote, 
 
 166. Id. at 1147. 
 167. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 511 (1954) (“In United States v. Hayman, 
342 U.S. 205, 219 [1952], we stated the purpose of § 2255 was to ‘meet practical difficulties’ 
in the administration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. We added: ‘Nowhere in the history 
of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack 
upon their convictions.’”). 
 168. See generally United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213–22 (1952) (discussing 
the legislative history of § 2255). 
 169. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1308 
The contention is made that § 2255 . . . should be construed to 
cover the entire field of remedies in the nature of coram nobis in the 
federal courts. We see no compelling reason to reach this 
conclusion. . . . [T]he purpose of § 2255 was “to meet practical 
difficulties” in the administration of federal habeas corpus 
jurisdiction.170 
Indeed, the Court knew “of nothing in the legislative history that 
indicate[d] a different conclusion.”171 Thus, § 2255 was not meant 
as a comprehensive regime for collateral review; rather, it was a 
statutory fix to a practical problem. Its limitation to prisoners “in 
custody” is thus not the result of a deliberate policy decision to limit 
all collateral review to those still incarcerated, but rather an accurate 
codification of traditional habeas corpus requirements. The Seventh 
Circuit’s conclusion—“[w]hen the custody ends so does the 
justification for this review”172—is trivially correct if it is meant to 
refer only to  
§ 2255 review but meaningless if it is meant to refer to coram nobis. 
The “custody” requirement of § 2255 reflects the traditional 
scope of the writ of habeas corpus; it tells us nothing about the scope 
of coram nobis. To say as much is not to “treat the ‘custody’ 
requirement of § 2255 as a mistake,” as Judge Easterbrook 
suggested,173 but rather to treat the custody requirement as it plainly 
is: limited to § 2255 review. Judge Easterbrook’s pronouncement 
that “[t]here has to be a substitute for the ‘custody’ requirement”174 
is no more than his own innovation, without basis either in statute or 
in the history of coram nobis jurisprudence.175 
 
 170. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 510–11 (quoting Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219). 
 171. Id. at 511. 
 172. United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1147 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. The Fourth Circuit got this issue exactly right back in 1966 when it decided Mathis 
v. United States, 369 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1966). There, the court had to decide whether Morgan 
and § 2255 required that a coram nobis petitioner suffer from a “present imposition” 
(analogous to a civil disability) in order to qualify for a hearing. The court wrote, 
While in Morgan the defendant’s status as a second offender constituted a “present 
imposition” flowing from the prior conviction, the Court did not expressly or 
impliedly lay down such a requirement for the granting of the writ. Indeed, to the 
extent that the “present imposition” doctrine is analogous to the “in custody” 
proviso in section 2255, the Court implicitly rejected it as a prerequisite to the grant 
of coram nobis by holding that Congress did not intend to restrict other post-
conviction remedies by enacting section 2255. 
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Indeed, to demand that the limits of habeas review apply to 
coram nobis review is to completely misunderstand the import of the 
Morgan decision, which was to establish coram nobis as a form of 
post-conviction review precisely for those not in custody. The 
Morgan Court retrofitted the ancient writ of coram nobis to fill a gap 
in post-conviction review. That gap was the lack of a well-established 
procedure for attaining collateral review for those not covered by  
§ 2255. So to argue that § 2255 compels the courts to create 
impediments to post-conviction review for those not covered by  
§ 2255 is to fundamentally misunderstand the limited scope of  
§ 2255 and the explicit holding of the Court in Morgan.176 
V. THE REPUTATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION 
In the trio of opinions that laid down the civil disabilities test, 
the Seventh Circuit held that reputational injury and professional 
harm do not rise to the level of harm necessary to invoke coram 
nobis. Such harms, the court argued, were not unique to criminal 
conviction and thus not amenable to redress by vacating a criminal 
conviction.177 The Seventh Circuit also flirted with the idea that such 
harms are not weighty enough to trigger a real case or controversy or 
to give a coram nobis petitioner legal standing.178 I will argue against 
these views and contend, to the contrary, that the civil disabilities 
test severely undervalues the reputational, professional, and social 
consequences of criminal conviction, and, as a result, denies 
 
Id. at 47. Or, as the D.C. Circuit recognized as far back as 1959, “The net of the situation is 
that while Congress, in Section 2255, was affording a new remedy for post conviction attacks 
on a federal sentence, no congressional purpose can be divined to exclude ancient remedies 
where the new one does not reach the particular problem.” Thomas v. United States, 271 F.2d 
500, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
 176. One might defend the Seventh Circuit position by arguing that Judge Easterbrook 
spoke of “the principles underlying the ‘custody’ requirement of § 2255,” not the explicit text 
of § 2255. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1146 (emphasis added). But once we understand that the 
“custody” requirement of § 2255 was not based on some abstract principle about the necessity 
of ongoing deprivation, but rather reflected the uncontroversial limits of habeas relief, then we 
see that there are no congressionally-endorsed “principles underlying the ‘custody’ 
requirement”—and thus no congressionally-endorsed principles that would demand a 
“custody-substitute” in the context of coram nobis review. 
 177. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1148 (“[R]eputational injury from conviction . . . does not 
suffice—civil judgments, too, cause loss of money and reputation.”). 
 178. United States v. Keane 852 F.2d 199, 204 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A strong emotional 
interest is not enough to produce an Article III case or controversy.”). 
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collateral relief to deserving petitioners.179 Indeed, conventional 
standing doctrine and common-law defamation are two well-
established areas of law that already recognize reputational harm as 
real, weighty, and deserving of legal redress.180 
Many judges and commentators have discussed the unique 
“stigma” of criminal conviction and its distinct shaming function in 
our system of criminal justice.181 Others have noted the stiff barriers 
that ex-offenders face in the job market.182 Criminal convictions may 
carry fines or other monetary penalties that can bankrupt or 
impoverish their targets for years to come or, indeed, for the rest of 
their lives. These are not trivial consequences of conviction, and they 
last a lifetime. They do not end when “civil disabilities” end, and 
they impact the day-to-day wellbeing of convicted persons just as 
severely as formal disabilities, if not more so. 
Of course, not every conviction leads to every potential negative 
collateral consequence, and many convicted persons would face 
difficult professional paths and dubious reputations regardless of 
their on-the-record conviction. The courts do not have a 
freestanding obligation to help out every ex-offender in vindicating 
his or her reputation and smoothing his or her career path. But the 
courts do have an obligation to remove the one source of stigma 
 
 179. By “deserving petitioner,” I mean a petitioner who suffers from the collateral 
consequences of unlawful conviction but cannot prove a “disability” of the kind recognized by 
the civil disabilities test. 
 180. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472–77 (1987) (potential distributor of 
foreign films had standing to challenge Justice Department’s characterization of films as 
“political propaganda” because it would affect “his personal, political, and professional 
reputation” and impair his ability to practice his profession); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 559 (1977) (defining a defamatory statement as one that “tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third 
persons from associating or dealing with him”). 
 181. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997) (noting the “opprobrium and 
stigma of a criminal conviction”); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 302 (1996) 
(quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864–65 (1985)) (referring to the “societal 
stigma accompanying any criminal conviction”); see also Chad Flanders, Shame and the 
Meanings of Punishment, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609, 632 (arguing that stigma is inherent to 
criminal conviction). 
 182. See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME 112–20 (2003) 
(discussing “employment barriers and workplace restrictions” facing released prisoners); 
JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER RE-
ENTRY 151–85 (2005) (discussing employment challenges of released prisoners); Marlaina 
Freisthler & Mark A. Godsey, Going Home to Stay: A Review of Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, Post-incarceration Employment, and Recidivism in Ohio, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 525, 
532–40 (2005). 
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over which they have exclusive control—a judgment of conviction—
if it turns out that the person so stigmatized did not commit a crime. 
In this Part, I will first summarize the literature on the “non-
legal” collateral consequences of criminal conviction and explain why 
the reputational harm of conviction is more salient now than in the 
past. Then, I will show that our courts have consistently recognized 
reputational injury both as a threshold basis for litigation and as a 
type of injury susceptible to judicial redress. Thus, I argue, granting 
coram nobis relief to those bearing an unjust conviction and 
suffering reputational injury would be entirely consistent with 
general legal norms regarding reputational injury. 
A. Non-legal Collateral Consequences of Conviction 
The wide-ranging extent of civil disabilities triggered by criminal 
conviction is receiving increased scrutiny in the legal literature, and 
rightly so.183 Depending on the jurisdiction and the type of 
conviction, a single conviction may result in a plethora of adverse 
legal consequences apart from custody, ranging from 
disenfranchisement and inability to serve in the Armed Forces to 
ineligibility for welfare benefits, student loans, and public housing.184 
These disabilities are deemed “civil” in nature by the courts and not 
part of the proscribed punishment of the criminal law—hence, they 
are referred to as “collateral,” as opposed to direct, consequences of 
the criminal process. Defendants, even those contemplating plea-
bargains, are often unaware of these collateral consequences.185 And 
even savvy defense counsel would have great difficulty in explaining 
the full range of civil disabilities to their clients because such 
disabilities are scattered throughout the law, nowhere codified or 
 
 183. See, e.g., A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND 
DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
A.B.A. STANDARDS]; Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions 
on Collateral Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Margaret Colgate Love, 
Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705 (2003); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender 
Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006). 
 184. See Pinard & Thompson, supra note 183, at 586–87. 
 185. See id. at 590 (“Not only offenders, but many participants in the criminal justice 
system remain wholly unaware of these consequences.”); id. at 592 (“Typically, though, these 
collateral consequences do not surface in counseling sessions between lawyer and client or in 
the course of a guilty plea colloquy in court.”). 
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centralized.186 But as problematic as these civil disabilities are, 
particularly for low-income ex-offenders, they are at least on the 
books and thus subject to criticism and debate. Moreover, the civil 
disabilities test recognizes the bite of these collateral consequences 
and holds out the possibility of coram nobis relief to a petitioner 
who can show present, non-trivial harm as a result of such official 
civil disabilities. 
In addition to the formal civil disabilities affecting the rights and 
privileges of a convicted person vis-à-vis the state, we must also 
consider the non-legal collateral consequences of conviction. 
Criminal conviction is not only a process leading to direct sentencing 
and collateral legal consequences—it also represents a serious social 
stigma, one of society’s most effective ways of broadcasting that a 
particular individual engaged in deviant conduct. Some sociologists 
liken conviction to a “Mark of Cain,” a stigmata perhaps less cruel 
than branding but serving the same function in a bureaucratic 
vein.187 The important point is that a conviction has social meaning 
and changes a person’s social status. We have words such as criminal, 
convict, ex-con, offender, etc., each of which suggests the negative 
social status resulting from conviction. Conviction is part of a process 
of “tagging, defining, identifying, segregating, describing, 
emphasizing, making conscious and self-conscious”188 the criminal 
element in society. The economic, social, and domestic 
consequences of conviction can be severe. 
The most tangible of the non-legal consequences of conviction is 
the loss of employment prospects. Upon conviction, a whole range 
of public-sector and regulated occupations become immediately off 
limits. These include a vast array of government, military, 
transportation, medical, legal, and even real estate positions, among 
others.189 More importantly, the lack of private-sector opportunities 
is correspondingly severe. Many studies have detailed the 
(understandable) reluctance of employers to hire ex-offenders.190 In 
 
 186. See Demleitner, supra note 183, at 154. 
 187. SHLOMO SHOHAM, THE MARK OF CAIN: THE STIGMA THEORY OF CRIME AND 
SOCIAL DEVIATION 9 (1970). 
 188. Id. at 155. 
 189. See Demleitner, supra note 183, at 156–57. 
 190. See, e.g., Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the Intersection 
of Prisoner Reentry, Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 
269 (2006). 
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one Urban Institute study “examining the willingness of employers 
to hire from disadvantaged or stigmatized groups, convicted felons 
placed dead last, with only 40% of employers saying they would 
‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ hire someone with a criminal record for an 
unskilled position.”191 Another “study conducted in five major cities 
showed that two-thirds of employers would not knowingly hire a 
former offender.”192 Very often employers’ standard application 
forms ask whether the applicant has ever been convicted of a 
felony,193 and background checks have become “standard operating 
procedure” at many businesses, up to 80% in one estimate.194 As 
online record searches become ever more available, it is nearly 
costless and trivially easy for an employer to check the conviction 
record of any applicant.195 
Even putting aside the explicit actions of employers to keep ex-
offenders off their payrolls, ex-offenders face a more difficult task 
finding a job than others because their conviction and incarceration 
break up the normal social support systems through which many 
people find their jobs. Research has shown that many, if not most, 
people actually find employment through established social 
networks, including family, friends, classmates, and colleagues.196 It 
is not surprising that criminal conviction often severs or downgrades 
one’s relationships with family, friends, colleagues, and other 
acquaintances, and ex-offenders find their pre-conviction social 
networks shrunken upon release from incarceration. Whatever new 
networks they have established since prison are likely to promote 
criminality and isolate the ex-offender even more from licit 
 
 191. Id. (citing TRAVIS, supra note 182, at 164). 
 192. Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional 
Framework for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 
J.L. SOC’Y 18, 22 (2005) (citing JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY L. SOLOMAN & MICHELLE WAUL, 
FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 31 
(2001)). 
 193. This formulation has entered the popular culture as well. See, e.g., ICE CUBE, What 
Can I Do?, on LETHAL INJECTION (Priority Records 1993) (“Have you ever been convicted of 
a felony? Yes.”). 
 194. Aukerman, supra note 192, at 23. 
 195. See Brad Stone, If You Run a Red Light, Will Everyone Know?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 
2008, at BU4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/technology/03essay. 
html (detailing availability of free online criminal searches). 
 196. See generally MARK S. GRANOVETTER, GETTING A JOB: A STUDY OF CONTACTS 
AND CAREERS (2d ed. 1995). 
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employment.197 This pattern holds true whether the convicted 
person comes from a low-income area with few employment 
opportunities or from a prosperous professional suburb. Criminal 
conviction can devastate the already-dicey employment prospects of 
an inner-city youth as well as those of an otherwise accomplished 
professional.198 The stigma of conviction makes potential contacts 
less likely to offer leads, make recommendations, put in a good 
word, or otherwise help in finding a job. 
The normal workings of the risk-management market also play a 
role in reducing employment opportunities for an ex-offender. For 
instance, many employers purchase fidelity bonding as a matter of 
course to insure against fraud, theft, and embezzlement by 
employees. But “many private insurers will not issue bonds for 
former inmates. Indeed, hiring a convicted felon in a bonded 
position may place the coverage of an entire business at risk.”199 
Finally, tort law itself provides private employers with an 
incentive not to hire ex-offenders. The tort of negligent employment 
or negligent hiring opens employers up to liability for the acts of 
their employees even outside of traditional respondeat superior 
liability.200 If a company fails to investigate the criminal history of an 
employee, it may be liable for injuries resulting from that employee’s 
actions even if the conduct occurs outside the scope of 
employment.201 The tort of negligent hiring has become increasingly 
popular and “tends to result in plaintiff’s verdicts large enough to 
destroy a small business.”202 It goes without saying that many 
prudent employers make it a policy to steer clear of convicted 
persons entirely. And the available statistics bear out the common-
sense proposition that convicted persons face a more difficult job 
 
 197. John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for 
Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 CRIME & JUST. 121, 134–37 (1999). 
 198. Indeed, to the extent that a professional or conventional businessperson operates in 
an environment in which criminal conviction is relatively rare, its reputational consequences 
may be even starker. 
 199. See Stafford, supra note 190, at 270 (internal footnotes omitted). 
 200. 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 395 (2004) (“Generally, an employer 
who hires an employee with knowledge of the employee’s prior criminal record may be held 
liable, on a direct-negligence theory, for the latter’s tortious conduct.”); see also Leroy D. 
Clark, A Civil Rights Task: Removing Barriers to Employment of Ex-Convicts, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 
193, 197 (2004). 
 201. See, e.g., Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991). 
 202. Stafford, supra note 190, at 270. 
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market than their non-convicted peers. One widely-quoted study 
showed that four out of five people who are convicted and 
incarcerated are unable to resume stable employment after release 
from prison.203 
B. Information Technology and the Spread of Stigma 
The reputational consequences of conviction are already 
substantial, but the ongoing explosion of information available over 
the Internet, particularly the marriage of record-keeping databases 
and the World Wide Web, greatly exacerbates the reputational 
damage of conviction.204 
Thanks to record-keeping requirements and information 
technology, the American criminal justice system has created an 
elaborate, if diffuse, “information infrastructure.” Starting from law 
enforcement and local court records, a “rap sheet” is created for 
virtually every person who is ever arrested or processed. Each rap 
sheet contains, at a minimum, a chronological description of the 
individual’s interactions with the criminal justice system, from arrest 
to judgment to sentencing, plus the individual’s fingerprints.205 
Every state maintains a database of rap sheet information, and the 
Federal Bureau of Information maintains a virtual national database 
through the National Crime Information Center. Though the NCIC 
database is directly accessible to law enforcement agencies only, “[a] 
large percentage of criminal background checks is carried out on 
behalf of public and private employers, landlords, and other agencies, 
organizations, and associations.”206 
Direct access to state-level “rap sheet” information differs from 
state to state, but the clear trend is toward increasing accessibility to 
those outside of traditional law enforcement.207 Some states treat 
individual criminal history records as public documents and make 
them available for free online. Oklahoma, for instance, maintains a 
website with a searchable database including “the records on file of 
 
 203. See Hagan & Dinovitzer, supra note 197, at 137. 
 204. For an intelligent discussion of the general consequences of the Information 
Revolution on our concept of reputation, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION (2007). 
 205. See James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 392–96 (2006). 
 206. Id. at 394. 
 207. Id. at 395. 
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offenders sentenced to a term of probation or incarceration within 
the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.”208 
In addition to the information made available by courthouses 
and states themselves, there is a large and growing market for 
criminal record information, which is serviced by dozens and dozens 
of “information brokers.”209 From instantpeoplecheck.com to 
efindoutthetruth.com, these information brokers tout their ability to 
provide members of the general public with comprehensive 
nationwide searches to reveal any criminal records. These services are 
available on a fee-per-search basis, subscription basis, or for free.210 
Even putting aside official criminal record searches, regular 
searches on Google can reveal convictions through reports in news 
stories, blogs, or other sources. As Professor Solove has written, 
“We’re heading toward a world where an extensive trail of 
information fragments about us will be forever preserved on the 
Internet, displayed instantly in a Google search. . . . This record will 
affect our ability to define our identities, to obtain jobs, to 
participate in public life, and more.”211 While a criminal conviction 
on one’s record may constitute only one factor in a person’s general 
reputational profile, it is a uniquely stigmatizing piece of 
information. To the extent that information technology makes 
possible a digital “scarlet letter,”212 convicted persons will likely bear 
a disproportionate brunt of such high-tech opprobrium.213 
The upshot is that personalized criminal history information is 
easy to access for anyone with an Internet connection, and the trend 
is toward ever more accessibility and diminishing costs. Though 
there has been intermittent congressional recognition that 
dissemination of a person’s criminal history constitutes an invasion of 
 
 208. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Offender Lookup, http://docapp065p. 
doc.state.ok.us/servlet/page?_pageid=395&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTAL30 (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2009). 
 209. See SEARCH: THE NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. AND STATISTICS, 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RECORD INFORMATION (2005), available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/ 
RNTFCSCJRI.pdf. 
 210. Stone, supra note 195 (detailing availability of free online criminal searches). 
 211. SOLOVE, supra note 204, at 17. 
 212. Id. at 11. 
 213. And while it is true that a Google search may reveal a conviction that was 
subsequently vacated—coram nobis relief will not magically erase all record of the original 
conviction—the same Google search may very well reveal the vacation of the conviction. 
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privacy,214 the U.S. Supreme Court held definitively in Paul v. Davis 
that there is no constitutional right to keep one’s criminal record 
private.215 And, as Professor Jacobs points out, the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee of public trials, coupled with the First Amendment right 
to publish information about crime, means that even good-faith 
efforts to restrict access to a person’s criminal history are likely to fall 
afoul of other constitutional values.216 
In short, so long as there is a demand for criminal background 
information, there will be a ready supply. And as bandwidth for data 
storage and data dissemination becomes ever more available, such 
information (like all information) will become even easier and 
cheaper to obtain. 
C. The Law’s Role in Righting Reputational Wrongs 
All of the reputational and professional harm associated with 
criminal conviction may be perfectly appropriate if the object of 
stigma, in fact, committed the crime for which he was convicted.217 
But one who suffers the adverse consequences of conviction for a 
crime he did not commit suffers an obvious injustice. The Seventh 
Circuit, however, has claimed that courts have no business righting 
reputational wrongs or “vindicat[ing]” the honor of the unjustly 
convicted.218 In Keane, Judge Easterbrook admitted that “conviction 
is a black mark” and, in more colorful language, “a blot on one’s 
escutcheon.”219 But he “decline[d] to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s 
apparent view that anyone may obtain coram nobis just to bask in 
the satisfaction of having his position vindicated.”220 Expanding on 
this reasoning in Bush, Judge Easterbrook argued that courts had no 
role in responding to the severe professional consequences of 
erroneous convictions because “[u]nwillingness to hire someone for 
mouth-watering jobs is not a legal disability . . . .”221 The Seventh 
 
 214. See Jacobs, supra note 205, at 407–10 (discussing, inter alia, the Federal Youth 
Corrections Act of 1950, the Privacy Act of 1974, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970). 
 215. 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). 
 216. See Jacobs, supra note 205, at 410. 
 217. My personal view is that the range and scope of collateral consequences of 
conviction are much too large, and I support efforts to document, rationalize, and reduce such 
collateral consequences. See, e.g., A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 183. 
 218. United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 204 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. (citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
 221. United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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Circuit view has been that no amount of reputational, professional, 
or financial injury is enough to trigger coram nobis review unless it 
counts as a formal civil disability.222 Indeed, the court’s opinions 
have suggested that coram nobis petitioners suffering only 
reputational injury may lack legal standing entirely. 
Asking courts to vindicate a litigant’s reputation is, according to 
Judge Easterbrook, “to send them on a fool’s errand, close to if not 
beyond the borders of the Article III ‘case or controversy’ given the 
uncertainty that the judicial declaration will redress the injury.”223 In 
an earlier case, he had written that a “strong emotional interest is not 
enough to produce an Article III case or controversy.”224 The 
implicit argument seems to be that a coram nobis petitioner cannot 
show the injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing, absent the 
specific civil disabilities that the Seventh Circuit has recognized. 
Judge Easterbrook is probably correct that the “strong emotional 
interest” of the petitioner in vacating his or her conviction is not 
enough to satisfy the injury requirement of federal standing.225 
Constitutional standing requires that a plaintiff show that he is 
suffering a “distinct and palpable” injury-in-fact, and not merely a 
“conjectural” or “hypothetical” harm.226 But he is wrong to suggest 
that reputational injury—a “blot on one’s escutcheon”—does not 
meet the injury-in-fact requirement. To the contrary, the Supreme 
Court and other federal courts have consistently held that an injury 
to one’s reputation satisfies the injury-in-fact standing 
requirement.227 To take one example, in Meese v. Keene the Supreme 
 
 222. I think it goes without saying that the law generally treats unjust financial injury as a 
ground for legal relief. So this section will deal only with the Seventh Circuit’s arguments to 
the effect that the courts have no role to play in righting reputational wrongs. 
 223. Bush, 888 F.2d at 1150. 
 224. Keane, 852 F.2d at 204. 
 225. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983) (“It is the reality of the 
threat of repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiff’s subjective 
apprehensions.”). 
 226. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). In addition to an injury-in-fact, a 
litigant must also be able to show that such injury is traceable or caused by the defendant, and 
that the court has the power to provide redress for the injury. E.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000). 
 227. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472–77 (1987) (potential distributor of 
foreign films had standing to challenge Justice Department’s characterization of films as 
“political propaganda” because it would affect “his personal, political, and professional 
reputation” and impair his ability to practice his profession); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 139 (1951) (charitable organizations designated as “Communist” 
by Attorney General had standing to challenge their designations because of, inter alia, 
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Court squarely addressed the issues of standing based on 
reputational and professional injury.228 The respondent sought to 
screen three films that the Department of Justice had designated 
“political propaganda” pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration 
Act.229 The Court accepted respondent’s claim that the “political 
propaganda” designation meant that he “could not exhibit the films 
without incurring a risk of injury to his reputation and of an 
impairment of his political career.”230 Thus, “the Act ‘puts the 
plaintiff to the Hobson’s choice of foregoing the use of the three 
Canadian films . . . or suffering an injury to his reputation.’”231 The 
Court held that the potential injury to the respondent’s reputation—
and, by extension, his political career—was sufficiently “distinct and 
palpable” to count as a “cognizable injury” for standing purposes.232 
Clear Supreme Court precedent thus precludes the argument that 
“mere” reputational or professional injury fails to satisfy the 
requirements of legal standing. And the civil disabilities test, insofar 
as it fails to recognize reputational and professional injury as grounds 
for relief, cannot justify itself on the basis of conventional standing 
doctrine. 
But, to its credit, the Seventh Circuit never relied extensively on 
standing doctrine in creating the civil disabilities test. Rather, it 
developed a policy argument against extending coram nobis relief to 
those suffering reputational harm and loss of professional prospects. 
The reason why such harm should not be recognized in coram nobis, 
 
“damage [to] the reputation of those organizations in their respective communities”); accord 
United States v. Accra Pac, Inc., 173 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[B]eing put on a 
blacklist . . . is treated as immediately redressible harm because it diminishes (or eliminates) the 
opportunity to practice one’s profession . . . .”). 
 228. 481 U.S. at 472–77. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 475. 
 231. Id. (citation omitted). 
 232. Id. at 472–73. The Court also held that the respondent’s claim met the traceability 
and redressibility requirements of constitutional standing because the adverse party (the 
Department of Justice) was responsible for designating the films as political propaganda and 
because an injunction against the designation would “at least partially redress the reputational 
injury of which appellee complains.” Id. at 476. In a coram nobis proceeding, the party adverse 
to the petitioner is the government, which is to say, the entity that prosecuted the petitioner, 
leading to his or her conviction. The injury alleged by the petitioner is thus “fairly traceable” 
back to the adverse party. Finally, the coram nobis petitioner’s injury is “likely . . . [to] be 
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 
(1992). That is, a favorable decision would vacate the conviction and thus remove the “blot on 
one’s escutcheon” that provoked the suit in the first place. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:21 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2009 
1320 
Judge Easterbrook wrote, is because “(a) it is not a legal disability, 
and a judgment therefore may be ineffectual in redressing it, and (b) 
it is different in degree, and not in kind, from the reputational injury 
accompanying all convictions.”233 As to the first reason (“it is not a 
legal disability”), Judge Easterbrook is correct, in some sense, that 
loss of professional opportunities is not itself a distinctly civil—that 
is, legally applied—disability. But his worry that “a judgment 
therefore may be ineffectual in redressing it” flies in the face of our 
general understanding of what courts do. Most harms for which 
people petition the courts are not “legal disabilities” in the sense he 
means; people resort to the courts to make them whole for damage 
to their persons, property, liberty, finances, and reputation, among 
other interests. Courts do not tell someone suffering from a broken 
arm, “We’re sorry, but your injury is not a legal disability, and 
therefore, a judgment of this court may be ineffectual in redressing 
it.” Courts determine whether another party is legally liable for the 
injury, and if so, they do their best to figure out a proper amount of 
compensation (“damages”). The fact that reputational or 
professional injury is not a “legal” or “civil” disability is not a reason 
to eschew the task of determining whether the injury is one that 
deserves relief. 
Second, the contention that reputational injury is not the kind of 
injury that a court can fruitfully investigate or redress is also 
misguided. Not only is reputational injury enough to establish legal 
standing, protecting a person’s reputation is one of the most time-
honored and vital functions of the judicial system.234 The entire law 
of defamation235 exists precisely to protect against reputational harm 
and to provide redress when one suffers from an injury to reputation. 
Defamation law goes back to the furthest reaches of the common law 
 
 233. United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 234. As the Supreme Court put it in the landmark case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
“the individual’s right to the protection of his own good name ‘reflects no more than our basic 
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any 
decent system of ordered liberty.’” 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 235. Defamation law today consists of the twin torts of libel and slander. Libel is 
defamation where the defamatory words are written or printed; slander is defamation where 
the defamatory words are spoken. E.g., Kennedy v. Children’s Serv. Soc’y of Wis., 17 F.3d 
980, 984 (7th Cir. 1994). In addition to libel and slander, the privacy torts, especially “false 
light,” provide legal redress to those who have suffered a reputational injury, though there are 
complex disputes about the interests served by the privacy torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 652E (2009). 
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and beyond.236 And though no single definition can fully capture the 
entire concept, an Illinois appeals court helpfully defined defamation 
as “the publication of anything injurious to the good name or 
reputation of another, or which tends to bring him or her into 
disrepute.”237 The Restatement definition of a defamatory 
communication is one that “tends so to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to 
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”238 
Under defamation law, there is a class of statements that are 
called defamatory per se; these are statements deemed so manifestly 
injurious to a person’s reputation that the plaintiff need not prove 
“special harm.”239 In particular, courts consider it defamation per se 
to impute to another person criminal conduct that is punishable by 
state or federal incarceration.240 In other words, common-law courts 
have come to the conclusion that the mere allegation of serious 
criminal conduct is the kind of communication that is so harmful to 
one’s reputation that it counts, as a matter of law, as a defamatory 
statement.241 It should be clear, then, that an actual criminal 
conviction—that is, a public determination by a court that one is 
 
 236. One can trace the development of defamation law from ancient Rome to canon law 
to Medieval codes and finally to the establishment of the torts of libel and slander in the 
seventeenth century. See generally LAWRENCE MCNAMARA, REPUTATION AND DEFAMATION 
(2007); Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. 
REV. 546 (1903). In the twentieth century, the great debates over defamation focused on the 
relationship between the protection of reputation and the Free Speech and Free Press clauses 
of the First Amendment. Those debates are beyond the scope of this Article. It suffices here to 
note that while the First Amendment places some constraints on defamation actions, 
particularly against public figures, it remains a robust cause of action. See, e.g., Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (discussing balance between values of free speech and 
protection of reputation); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that 
“actual malice” test is not appropriate for plaintiff who is not a public figure); Curtis Publ’g 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extending “actual malice” test to public figures); N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that public official plaintiff must show 
“actual malice” in libel cases). 
 237. Marczak v. Drexel Nat’l Bank, 542 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
 238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
 239. Id. §§ 569–74. 
 240. Id. § 571. It is also per se defamatory to impute to another (a) a “loathsome 
disease,” (b) serious sexual misconduct, or (c) a characteristic making one unfit for one’s trade 
or profession. Id. § 570. 
 241. Of course, a successful defamation cause of action must also fulfill the other 
elements of the tort, which include at a minimum (a) falsity of the statement, (b) negligence or 
some higher degree of fault, and (c) publication. See id. § 558. 
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guilty of a crime—also carries a heavy reputational harm.242 Such 
reputational harm may be fully deserved when the defendant is, 
indeed, guilty. But the point is that the same court system that 
makes the imputation of serious criminal conduct defamatory per se 
should have no trouble recognizing the real reputational harms of a 
false conviction. 
Moreover, the right to recovery of money damages for 
defamation is not lost simply because determining the appropriate 
amount of damages is a difficult task. As one state supreme court put 
it, “The rule that damages, if uncertain, cannot be recovered, applies 
to their nature, and not to their extent. If the damage is certain, the 
fact that its extent is uncertain does not prevent a recovery.”243 Thus, 
a successful defamation claimant may recover both “general” 
damages for the reputational harm itself and “special” damages for 
concrete, pecuniary losses suffered as a result of the reputational 
harm.244 For instance, a person who falsely imputes criminal conduct 
to another may be liable both for the injury to the latter’s reputation 
(general damages) and for the loss of the latter’s job (“special” 
damages) if the firing was a direct consequence of the false 
imputation.245 
As standing and defamation law demonstrate, the legal system 
regularly recognizes reputational injury, has developed sophisticated 
doctrines for assessing it, and provides nominal, special, and general 
damages for redressing it. The law also recognizes that imputing 
serious criminal behavior to one who has not committed a crime 
counts as reputational injury—indeed, injury per se. The suggestion 
put forward by the creators of the civil disabilities test that a “blot on 
one’s escutcheon” is not the kind of harm that courts should spend 
time or resources on is belied by the long history and vitality of 
defamation law, as well as the black-letter law of legal standing. 
 
 242. Needless to say, judges and prosecutors are immune from defamation suits insofar as 
they accuse or convict criminal defendants, and properly so. Id. §§ 585–86. 
 243. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Shell, 90 So. 2d 719, 724 (Ala. 1956) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 244. See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 357 (2006). If a plaintiff can show 
defamation per se, but no discernible injury, he may recover “nominal” damages for the 
purpose of vindication. See id. § 361. 
 245. Depending on the case, punitive or exemplary damages may be available as well. See 
id. § 362. It is generally up to the jury to decide how much money should be paid to the 
plaintiff to compensate for general and/or special damages, though the court may interfere if 
the amount is grossly excessive or inadequate. See id. § 373. 
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Reputational injury, especially the kind suffered when one is unjustly 
deemed a criminal, is a real injury, and it is a real injury that our 
court system is well-equipped to handle. 
VI. FINALITY, JUDICIAL ECONOMY, AND THE CIVIL DISABILITIES 
TEST 
Ultimately, the creators of the civil disabilities test sought to 
anchor the doctrine in the twin values of finality and judicial 
economy. By limiting the types of claims coram nobis petitioners can 
make, the civil disabilities test does indeed marginally reduce the 
caseload of some courts, and it also brings the litigation associated 
with some prosecutions to a definitive end.246 But in this Part, I aim 
to show that the civil disabilities test fails in large part to deliver on 
its promise of promoting finality and judicial economy. On the other 
hand, it succeeds all too well in undermining the systemic value of 
accuracy. 
“The norm of finality,” Judge Easterbrook wrote, “with an 
exception while custody or another deprivation of liberty continues, 
is the background for understanding the writ of error coram 
nobis.”247 Finality, of course, is the principle that criminal cases must 
come to an end at some point, that there must be a final 
determination of guilt (or non-guilt) if the judicial system is to 
perform its core functions.248 As Judge Easterbrook put it, 
“Everyone is entitled to a full and fair opportunity for litigation, and 
no one is entitled to multiple opportunities.”249 Rules favoring 
finality, he argued, “induce parties to concentrate their energies and 
resources on getting things right the first time.”250 And, in any event, 
 
 246. In other words, the civil disabilities test closes the last possible door to collateral 
relief for many claimants. 
 247. United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 202 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 248. These functions include, among others, distinguishing the guilty from the not-
guilty, punishing the guilty, releasing the not-guilty, deterring potential wrongdoers, and 
beginning the healing process for victims and the rehabilitation process for criminals. For the 
classic argument in favor of privileging finality in collateral review, see Paul M. Bator, Finality 
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 
(1963). 
 249. Keane, 852 F.2d at 201. 
 250. Id. This is a particularly strange argument to make with reference to Keane’s case, 
for Keane, as the court conceded, concentrated very clearly “before, during, and after trial” on 
precisely the issue that formed the basis of his coram nobis proceeding—namely, the 
“‘intangible rights’ aspect of the indictment and the jury instruction.” Id. There was no 
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there is no guarantee that continued review of a case is likely to lead 
to a better outcome. After all, “if hindsight shows the error of the 
first decision, it may show the error of the second in turn.”251 Worse 
yet, “[f]rom a systemic perspective, time consumed relitigating one 
case subtracts from the time available to litigate others.”252 These 
principles of finality and judicial economy, Judge Easterbrook 
reasoned, militated in favor of the civil disabilities test because, 
without such a test, the writ of coram nobis would stand as a 
limitless invitation to “relitigation” of old criminal cases.253 
A. The Cost to Accuracy 
What Judge Easterbrook’s paean to the values of finality and 
judicial economy leaves out is our system’s laudable commitment to 
accuracy—getting things right, not just getting things done. From 
the perspective of accuracy, the essential problem with the civil 
disabilities test is that it leads to the absurd situation in which a 
judge may concede that the person before him is not guilty of a 
crime and yet refuses to vacate an unlawful conviction on that 
person’s record. This is essentially what happened in the Seventh 
Circuit Bush and Craig cases. In those cases, the defendants were 
convicted of mail fraud under a theory of the crime that had been 
conclusively rejected by the Supreme Court. There is little doubt 
that, if the court were to have reached the merits in those two cases, 
it would have found in favor of the petitioners and granted relief. It 
is hard to overstate the basic injustice here: the state prosecutes you, 
convicts you, imprisons or otherwise punishes you, all on a 
misreading of the criminal statute, and then the court refuses to 
vacate the conviction because, it claims, you are no longer suffering 
“lingering civil disabilities.” 
But an injustice of this sort is not a concern only to the 
individual who bears its brunt; it is a major failure of a justice system. 
Faced with incontrovertible evidence that it improperly or incorrectly 
convicted someone, a system seeking accuracy-in-justice must rectify 
the mistake by, at minimum, formally revoking the erroneous 
 
argument to be made in Keane that he was precluded from arguing the “intangible right” issue 
in a collateral proceeding for lack of raising the issue at trial or on direct appeal. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 206. 
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conviction.254 To do otherwise—to refuse to hear the case for 
extraneous reasons—is to signal that accurately distinguishing the 
guilty from the not-guilty is not, after all, the most privileged value 
of the system. This is worrisome for the intrinsic reason that justice 
systems should strive for accuracy, and for the extrinsic reason that 
the system loses legitimacy insofar as it is perceived to be indifferent 
to accuracy.255 
Of course, no justice system can afford to bankrupt itself in an 
endless quest for perfect accuracy; the resources of the system are 
finite, and there are important values other than accuracy, e.g., the 
protection of constitutional rights and fundamental fairness. But 
taking accuracy seriously means recognizing the costs to the system 
of refusing to correct manifestly unlawful convictions. When 
incommensurable values clash, one of them has to give, and our 
system recognizes that sometimes accuracy must give way to other 
values.256 But we should forthrightly take note of the loss of one 
value, even if we decide that another value trumps it in any particular 
case. The proponents of the civil disabilities test fail to recognize the 
systemic loss imposed by their preferred test. 
The closest that Judge Easterbrook comes to acknowledging the 
difficult trade-off involved in the civil disabilities test is this comment 
in Bush: “Although in the best of all worlds every judgment would 
be subject to correction as new facts came to light and legal 
 
 254. I leave it to others to discuss what kind of compensation might be due to someone 
unlawfully convicted and imprisoned. See, e.g., BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: 
WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2001); Adele Bernhard, When 
Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 
(1999); Jennifer L. Chunias & Yael D. Aufgang, Beyond Monetary Compensation: The Need for 
Comprehensive Services for the Wrongfully Convicted, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105 (2008); 
Lauren C. Boucher, Comment, Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for 
the Erroneously Convicted and Wrongfully Incarcerated, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1069 (2007). 
 255. The justice system’s legitimacy depends, in part, on a public perception that it 
renders reliable and accurate results. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32–43 (2d ed. 1992). A system that is seen as unresponsive to the 
legitimate petitions of unlawfully convicted persons is, all things being equal, a less legitimate 
system than one that takes such petitions seriously. It is true that an increase in post-conviction 
challenges may itself lead to a perception of unreliability of the criminal process. But the 
existence of mistakes—good-faith or otherwise—is a given in any criminal justice system; the 
question is whether the system is honest and self-confident enough to provide sufficient means 
of correction. 
 256. The exclusionary rule, which keeps evidence obtained unconstitutionally out of 
criminal trials, is an instance in which the value of accuracy bows to the value of protecting 
constitutional rights. The bar on double jeopardy is another. 
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principles were refined, in a costly legal system correction is a 
luxury.”257 This statement perfectly captures the misguided attitude 
that lies at the heart of the civil disabilities test. The idea is that 
finality is a necessity while correction (accuracy) is a luxury. Indeed, 
Judge Easterbrook wrote explicitly of “the finality doctrines that 
govern the legal system.”258 From the perspective of finality, then, the 
burden is always on collateral review procedures to justify 
themselves.259 But the problem with posing the question this way is 
that finality is not the only background norm in the system; 
accuracy—getting things right—is just as important (if not more so), 
and from that perspective one might ask what special circumstances 
justify the refusal of a court to grant relief to a petitioner suffering 
from an unlawful conviction. 
To that question—what justifies the court’s refusal to correct an 
unlawful conviction?—the defenders of the civil disabilities test offer 
two broad arguments, the first based on finality and the second on 
judicial economy. The first argument holds that allowing collateral 
review beyond the imposition of civil disabilities allows for perpetual 
review of criminal convictions and thus prevents the system from 
bringing any criminal case to a close. The argument based on 
judicial economy starts from the premise of scarcity and emphasizes 
the costs to the system as a whole of “endless” collateral review. On 
this view, the costs in time and resources of post-civil disabilities 
collateral review outweigh the potential benefits, and in any event, 
collateral review misdirects precious judicial resources away from 
solving fresh and unsettled cases to reviewing old and already-
decided cases. Worse yet, allowing for post-conviction review serves 
as a disincentive to resolve all issues at trial, which is the best possible 
forum for airing and resolving all factual and legal disputes. None of 
these arguments is ultimately convincing for the reasons I will 
explain below. 
 
 257. United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 258. Id. at 1151 (emphasis added). 
 259. Habeas, according to this view, is justified only because the petitioner is in state 
custody. Thus, coram nobis may be justified only if there is some “custody-substitute” such as 
a civil disability. 
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B. Assessing the Finality Argument 
Finality is the value most often cited in favor of the civil 
disabilities test. Cases must come to an end; justice must be done in 
order for justice to be done. As Justice Harlan put it: 
Both the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest 
in insuring that there will at some point be the certainty that comes 
with an end to litigation, and that attention will ultimately be 
focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather 
on whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the 
community.260 
A couple of points should be made at the outset of this 
discussion. First, the ability to reach a final decision is a desirable trait 
of a criminal justice system, but it loses much of its luster if we 
imagine it as a final, unalterable, and erroneous decision. Any rule 
that prevents further review of a criminal case by definition 
entrenches erroneous decisions just as much as correct ones. Second, 
we should be clear about what finality or a lack of finality actually 
implies. A person convicted and sentenced at trial will ordinarily be 
incarcerated immediately upon sentencing, or in some cases, after all 
direct appeals are exhausted. The existence of collateral review does 
not mean that the decision of the court and the imposition of 
punishment are delayed until all collateral review is completed. To 
the contrary, the state treats a defendant as guilty as soon as the 
court so declares. Collateral review, thus, does not prevent “final” 
judgments of guilt and does not stand in the way of prescribed 
punishments.261 Collateral review provides a very narrow opportunity 
 
 260. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This 
view was later adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 
127 (1982) (quoting Sanders, 373 U.S. at 24–25 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). But see Ashe v. 
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 464–65 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]n criminal cases, 
finality and conservation of private, public, and judicial resources are lesser values than in civil 
litigation.”). 
 261. Bryan A. Stevenson, Director of the Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, put this 
point best: 
Between 1995 and 2004, ninety-nine percent of all federal habeas filings were made 
by prisoners not under a sentence of death. Accordingly, filing a habeas petition 
neither delays nor avoids a petitioner’s sentence. Almost every habeas petitioner has 
a compelling incentive to achieve efficient and timely review of his claims because he 
contends that his detention or imprisonment is wrongful. Whether the punishment 
is five years of incarceration or fifty years, it is being fully implemented during the 
pendency of any collateral litigation. 
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to some convicted criminals to challenge their convictions after they 
have been found guilty. The grounds for vacating a guilty verdict are 
narrow; the petitioner does not enjoy the presumption of innocence, 
and the chances of success are slim.262 It is only in this limited sense, 
then, that post-conviction review procedures can be deemed an 
affront to finality. Collateral review leaves open the possibility of 
correction—that is, vacating an erroneous conviction—but it does 
not stop or even “pause” the functioning of the criminal justice 
system.263 
But the main problem with the finality argument as it relates to 
the civil disabilities test is that it both proves too much and offers too 
little. It proves too much because the argument that the doctrines of 
finality “govern” the legal system would suggest a much earlier end-
point to collateral review than current doctrine allows. Under our 
current system, a criminal defendant may spend years and years 
exhausting his right of appeal upon criminal conviction, petitioning 
for Supreme Court review, and when that fails, petitioning for 
habeas and eventually coram nobis. Fealty to the value of finality 
would demand the evisceration of many appellate and collateral 
review procedures that come long before coram nobis. Proponents 
of the civil disabilities test might argue that incarceration and the 
imposition of civil disabilities are the only factors that justify the 
existing exceptions to the rule of finality. But these appellate and 
collateral procedures cannot be understood solely as exceptions to 
the otherwise dominant norm of finality; they have become 
important procedures for the promotion of the systemic value of 
accuracy, no matter their origin. Systemic accuracy does not 
suddenly become unimportant at the point when civil disabilities 
 
Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral 
Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 352 (2006). 
 262. A major 2007 empirical study of federal habeas review found that only seven out of 
2,384 randomly-selected non-capital habeas cases resulted in any relief for the petitioner. 
Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical 
Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts 52 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (finding a “0.29%” rate of relief for federal habeas 
petitioners). A 1991 study of habeas petitions in New York showed that, on average, only 
three or four percent of prisoners seeking collateral review are successful. Richard Faust et al., 
The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 680–81 (1991). 
 263. Death penalty cases are an obvious exception, as collateral procedures may, in fact, 
delay the imposition of the prescribed penalty. But death is different, and finality concerns cut 
both ways in such capital cases. 
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disappear. If coram nobis review is worthwhile for accuracy’s sake 
while civil disabilities are imposed, then it is also worthwhile after 
civil disabilities have ended. 
At the same time, the civil disabilities test fails to deliver on its 
promise of promoting finality. True, it picks out a point at which all 
collateral review must end. But it is a point over which the federal 
judiciary has no control and which, in many instances, never comes. 
Whether a petitioner faces lingering civil disabilities is dependent on 
the federal, state, and local law (including administrative rules) 
applicable to that petitioner and on the petitioner’s own actions and 
intentions. The extent of civil disabilities differs significantly from 
state to state and frequently from locality to locality. For example, in 
some states, such as Alabama, a felony conviction for a crime of 
“moral turpitude” results in automatic disenfranchisement.264 There 
is no doubt that such disenfranchisement constitutes a civil disability 
even under the Seventh Circuit approach; consequently, a convicted 
felon in Alabama would enjoy practically “life-long” access to coram 
nobis under the civil disabilities test. To cite another example, one of 
the Craig plaintiffs’ claims to coram nobis was rejected, in part, 
because there was no proof that he had a “present desire” to re-apply 
for bar membership.265 Had there been such proof, then perhaps he 
too would have had access to the writ. 
Indeed, the civil disabilities test requires such a significant legal 
and factual investigation—what civil disabilities are in force, and 
which did petitioner actually face?—that the putative benefits of 
finality are hard to come by. One could imagine a different rule that 
would better promote the value of finality uniformly across 
jurisdictions and with a much brighter line—for instance, a strict 
statute of limitations on post-custody collateral review of, say, four 
years. However harsh such a rule might be—and I would not 
support such a rule—it would at least have the virtue of providing a 
date certain for an end to collateral review, and it would be as easy to 
administer as counting days on a calendar. Moreover, it would allow 
the sentencing court to control the point at which all collateral 
review would end. In contrast, the searching legal and factual review 
 
 264. ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 177(b) (“No person convicted of a felony involving moral 
turpitude, or who is mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote until restoration of civil 
and political rights or removal of disability.”). 
 265. United States v. Craig, 907 F.2d 653, 659 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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required by the civil disabilities test results in uncertainty about when 
any particular individual’s access to collateral review expires. 
Thus, while the civil disabilities test provides a theoretical end-
point for all collateral review, its proponents cannot claim that the 
test accomplishes much for the norm of finality. The test is difficult 
to administer, the federal judiciary has almost no control over the 
laws and circumstances upon which the test turns, and many 
petitioners will continue to enjoy “perpetual” access to coram nobis 
because they suffer perpetual civil disabilities. Thus, the argument 
from finality fails on its own terms to provide a cogent case for the 
civil disabilities test. 
C. Assessing the Judicial Economy Argument 
The judicial economy argument fails for the same basic reason 
that the finality argument fails: its proponents cannot show why the 
end of civil disabilities represents the magic moment at which further 
collateral review becomes inefficient. The basic form of the judicial 
economy argument is that, after civil disabilities no longer apply, the 
costs of the coram nobis procedure are greater than the benefits 
thereof. The idea is that the “stakes” are so low in post-civil 
disabilities collateral review that they are not worth the costs of the 
review itself. 
But measuring the costs and benefits of coram nobis is a tricky 
proposition. While the litigation costs of the parties and of the court 
are relatively easy to measure, the value of vacating an erroneous 
conviction for the individual petitioner, or the value of accuracy for 
the society as a whole, is not. How much is personal vindication 
worth, and how shall we measure marginal units of systemic accuracy 
and legitimacy? Then, there is the even more difficult problem of 
measuring opportunity costs—are there alternative procedures which 
would be of more value to the system as a whole? Such questions 
reveal the poverty of a strictly utilitarian approach to collateral 
review. Concepts such as systemic accuracy, finality, and reputational 
harm do not lend themselves to easy measurement. Indeed, they are 
classically “incommensurable” values—there is no neutral, 
transcendent value by which we can measure their relative 
importance. It is thus practically impossible to measure with 
utilitarian precision all of the competing values and personal interests 
at stake in determining the availability of coram nobis. 
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But even if it were possible to measure the costs and benefits of a 
procedure such as coram nobis, the proponents of the civil 
disabilities test must show that the moment at which the net benefit 
of coram nobis goes negative—i.e., the moment at which the costs of 
the procedure become greater than its benefits—is precisely the 
moment at which civil disabilities no longer apply to the petitioner. 
This they have not even begun to show. It is true that, all things 
being equal, the benefit to the individual petitioner of coram nobis 
relief is greater if the individual suffers from a civil disability than if 
he does not. But every other factor in the cost-benefit analysis 
remains the same—the litigation costs, the reputational and 
professional benefits to the individual of relief, and the benefits to 
the overall accuracy and legitimacy of the system. As noted in Part V, 
the formal civil disabilities suffered by the petitioner may be a very 
small marginal harm compared to the reputational and professional 
damage that a conviction on his record brings. It is thus highly 
improbable that even a notional cost-benefit analysis would 
determine that coram nobis is efficient during the imposition of civil 
disabilities, but inefficient afterwards.266 
One might also object to the whole premise of the judicial 
economy argument, for we do not ordinarily dismiss civil suits for 
being “inefficient.” So long as the plaintiff can show a stake sufficient 
to maintain standing and a legitimate cause of action, the case 
proceeds. We do not demand of the plaintiff that he prove that his 
case is socially efficient and that its determination constitutes the best 
use of judicial time and resources. 
Moreover, the argument that the federal courts would face a 
“flood” of coram nobis cases in the absence of the civil disabilities 
test fails to meet the evidence. The Ninth Circuit has offered coram 
nobis without a civil disabilities test since 1987 and has yet to meet 
with results that seriously hamper judicial economy. Since the year 
2000, fewer than 100 coram nobis cases have been filed in the Ninth 
Circuit, hardly a “flood” preventing the Ninth Circuit from 
dispensing justice in other cases.267 Moreover, to make a doctrinal 
 
 266. And if such a cost-benefit analysis were to show that coram nobis is inefficient both 
before and after civil disabilities, then it proves too much, for coram nobis during the 
imposition of civil disabilities is not in controversy. 
 267. A search of the Ninth Circuit combined dockets database on Westlaw yields fewer 
than 100 cases since January 1, 2000, with the “cause segment” identified as “petition for writ 
of coram nobis.” 
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decision based on a vague fear of opening up the “floodgates of 
litigation” is to misconstrue the role of the federal judiciary, which is 
to decide the legitimate cases before it, not to manage its caseload 
through manipulation of doctrine.268 Of course, judges may be 
mindful of the practical consequences of their decisions, but it is 
indefensible to limit collateral review on a misguided notion that a 
marginally more liberal standard would flood the courts. 
Judge Easterbrook made a related “efficiency” argument in 
Keane. He suggested that every additional collateral procedure 
disincentivizes the drive for accuracy at trial. “The prospect of 
relitigation,” wrote Judge Easterbrook, “would reduce the effective 
stakes of the first case, leading to an erosion in accuracy.”269 The idea 
here is that parties to the criminal case should “concentrate their 
energies and resources on getting things right the first time.”270 By 
providing post-trial and post-appeal procedures to review the case, 
collateral review lowers the stakes of the trial and thus takes away 
from the effort and resources invested therein. 
For a moment, let us assume the soundness of the argument. 
The trouble again is that the proponents of the civil disabilities test 
must show that the end of civil disabilities marks the crucial point in 
the balance between making collateral review available and 
incentivizing robust trials. In other words, proponents must show 
that the marginal increase in collateral review that would result from 
the absence of the civil disabilities test would decisively reduce the 
stakes of trial such that net systemic accuracy would fall. No such 
argument has been made. 
Moreover, collateral review already exists, and it flies in the face 
of common sense to suspect that criminal defendants routinely 
choose to forego available defenses because of the availability of 
collateral review. Professor Yackle put it best: 
It would be nonsense for defense attorneys to hold potentially 
meritorious claims in reserve at trial, when the underlying facts and 
attendant arguments can be spread on the record and when the 
claims can either prevent the client’s conviction or lay the 
groundwork for appeal, in order to call them into service later—
 
 268. See generally Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2003) (criticizing arguments based on a fear of opening the 
floodgates of litigation). 
 269. United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199, 201 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 270. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/19/2009 7:21 PM 
1277 The Stigma of Conviction 
 1333 
when the claims will suffer from inadequate development in the 
record and, even at that, can be useful only to attack a conviction 
already in place.271 
Simply put, to consciously increase the chances of conviction at trial 
in the hopes that one can prevail on collateral review would be 
highly irrational. Thus, as an argument in favor of the civil disabilities 
test, the theory that the availability of collateral review disincentivizes 
robust trials fails to persuade. It relies on an unsubstantiated and 
wildly implausible view of criminal defendant behavior, and it does 
not begin to explain why the end of civil disabilities marks the best 
moment at which to cut off collateral review. 
There is one further incentives-based argument that proponents 
of the civil disabilities test might make. It is an elaboration of the 
“floodgates” argument, but rather than focusing on the potential 
flood of litigation, it worries about the backlash to such a flood. 
Appellate judges, on this account, are correctly concerned with the 
real-world consequences of their decisions, and they know that any 
decision holding a criminal statute unconstitutional (or substantively 
narrowing its scope) will inevitably increase the number of people 
eligible for collateral review.272 The more collateral review procedures 
are available, the more fear judges will have that a liberalizing 
decision will result in a “flood” or disruptively large increase of 
collateral challenges.273 Thus, insofar as dispensing with the civil 
disabilities test would increase the availability of collateral review in 
general, it would also lead to fewer liberalizing decisions in the 
criminal law.274 
 
 271. Larry W. Yackle, Form and Function in the Administration of Justice: The Bill of 
Rights and Federal Habeas Corpus, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 685, 722–23 (1990). 
 272. This is because current retroactivity jurisprudence holds that collateral review 
petitioners receive the benefit of the latest authoritative cases on the constitutionality and 
substantive interpretation of criminal statutes. See id.; supra Part III.C. 
 273. As one commentator put it, 
The limited use of retroactivity is also necessary for the development of 
constitutional law. The Supreme Court is obviously reluctant to announce decisions 
that provide for greater protection of criminal procedure, which would create a 
substantial strain on the judiciary. By allowing the retroactive application of all 
decisions, the cost of change would be very significant. 
Matthew R. Doherty, Note, The Reluctance Towards Retroactivity: The Retroactive Application 
of Laws in Death Penalty Collateral Review Cases, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 445, 474 (2004) 
(citations omitted). 
 274. This is not an argument that Judge Easterbrook, or any other judge, has made in 
the context of coram nobis. 
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This argument shares the form of the “floodgates” argument, as 
well as its basic flaws. Judges should not, as a matter of course, take 
caseload considerations into account when determining the legal 
rules applicable to a given case. To do so is particularly objectionable 
when trying to determine the constitutionality of a criminal statute 
or its substantive scope. The question before the court in such cases 
is whether the legislature has the constitutional authority to 
criminalize particular conduct or whether the legislature actually 
criminalized the particular conduct at issue. It is not about the 
consequences for collateral review. If a court held a criminal statute 
constitutional on the basis of judicial economy concerns, it would 
permit that which the constitution forbids; and if a court broadly 
read a criminal statute due to such concerns, it would make criminal 
that which no legislature criminalized. In either case, the court 
would fundamentally violate its function and role in the separation-
of-powers framework.275 
Moreover, decisions that liberalize criminal doctrines 
(constitutional or statutory) put certain areas out of the reach of the 
criminal law. Thus, any increase in collateral challenges will be offset 
by the decisions’ inherent docket-reducing tendencies, at least in the 
long run. Fewer or narrower criminal statutes mean fewer 
opportunities for prosecution which, in turn, mean fewer 
opportunities for litigation. It would be perverse, indeed, if a court 
purposely expended judicial resources in enforcing unconstitutional 
laws for the purpose of reducing its caseload.276 
And yet it is fair to assume that some or many judges do, in fact, 
worry about the caseload implications of their decisions, particularly 
in the realm of collateral review where the number of habeas 
petitions is a perennial issue of concern. But it is highly implausible 
that the civil disabilities test does any real work in affecting appellate 
judges’ calculations on these matters. It has long been the case that 
 
 275. See Stern, supra note 268, at 396–403 (discussing the separation-of-powers 
argument against judicial decisions based on caseload concerns). 
 276. In any event, the reason that collateral review concerns creep in here at all is the 
doctrine that constitutional and substantive criminal decisions should be “retroactively” 
applied to cases on collateral review. If one is worried about the collateral review consequences 
of constitutional and substantive criminal decisions, then the place to advocate change is not in 
constitutional and substantive decisions, but rather in our retroactivity jurisprudence. For a 
penetrating analysis of the flaws in current retroactivity jurisprudence, see Kermit Roosevelt 
III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. 
REV. 1075 (1999). 
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new substantive rules (constitutional or statutory) are applied on 
collateral review, and nobody has argued that this retroactivity has, 
in fact, had any discernible effect on constitutional or criminal 
statutory interpretation.277 
D. Assessing Abuse-of-the-Writ Worries 
But a nagging worry persists: even if the values of finality and 
judicial economy do not strictly compel the adoption of the civil 
disabilities test, without it what would prevent the lifelong abuse of 
the writ by petitioners who have no realistic chance of relief? The 
suggestion is that the civil disabilities test, whatever its origins, 
provides a necessary check on a writ that otherwise would be subject 
to perpetual abuse. 
First, we should be careful to distinguish between a legitimate 
abuse-of-writ worry and a rhetorical jeremiad against “life-long” 
litigation.278 The legitimate worry is that without the civil disabilities 
test there is no way to definitively prevent a petitioner from filing 
multiple and successive petitions for coram nobis, needlessly 
clogging a court’s docket. But the “life-long” worry misses the point 
entirely. The fact that without the civil disabilities test coram nobis 
would theoretically be available for the duration of a convicted 
person’s natural life is a feature of coram nobis, not a bug. Life-long 
accessibility is precisely what coram nobis should provide. The stain 
of a criminal conviction lasts a lifetime, and thus the chance to wash 
away an erroneous or unlawful conviction should also last a lifetime. 
The individual always deserves a chance for vindication, and the 
system should always have a way to correct the record. 
The worry that coram nobis can and will be abused is serious and 
should not be discarded offhand. But the civil disabilities test simply 
does not prevent such abuses. Some of the Seventh Circuit’s rhetoric 
 
 277. Moreover, the marginal increase in collateral review that would result from 
jettisoning the civil disabilities test would barely register with federal judges. We could look to 
the Ninth Circuit to see whether a more liberal coram nobis regime actually results in fewer 
liberalizing criminal decisions. There are no studies on point, but there is no reason to suspect 
that Ninth Circuit judges are any more reluctant than their peers to strike down criminal laws 
as unconstitutional or to narrowly interpret them. 
 278. The dissent in Morgan expressed the “life-long” worry when it wrote about coram 
nobis: “The relief being devised here is either wide open to every ex-convict as long as he lives 
or else it is limited to those who have returned to crime and want the record expunged to 
lessen a subsequent sentence. Either alternative seems unwarranted . . . .” Morgan v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 502, 519 (1954) (Minton, J., dissenting). 
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may have purposely confounded the issue, but in fact, the civil 
disabilities test cuts down on abuse of the writ only insofar as it 
makes the writ categorically unavailable to a certain class of convicted 
persons. The civil disabilities test does nothing to prevent abuse of 
the writ by those who “pass” the test. The test does not provide 
courts with any mechanism to throw out redundant petitions or 
successive petitions so long as the petitioner suffers from a civil 
disability. Thus, proponents of the civil disabilities test have to 
answer the abuse of writ worry just as much as civil disabilities test 
detractors. 
Fortunately, courts are not powerless to prevent abuse of the 
writ, and they can and do craft doctrines to insure that collateral 
review petitions do not clog the system. Coram nobis has always 
been an extraordinary remedy for errors “of the most fundamental 
character,” available only when “sound reasons [exist] for failure to 
seek appropriate earlier relief.”279 Thus, coram nobis comes with a 
built-in requirement that the petitioner prove that he could not have 
reasonably made the claims he is now making any earlier. This 
requirement ipso facto grants the court the right to dismiss petitions 
that repeat arguments already made in previous petitions or at 
previous points in the underlying litigation. Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit refers to this threshold requirement that the petitioner show 
a genuinely novel claim as “a gate-keeping framework,” reflecting its 
understanding of the importance of preventing abuse of the writ. 280 
In addition, the common-law doctrine of laches serves as a back-
up reason to reject petitions from those who unreasonably delay 
 
 279. Id. at 512 (majority opinion); see also United States v. Sloan, 505 F.3d 685, 697 
(7th Cir. 2007) (requiring “sound reasons for the failure to seek earlier relief”); United States 
v. Walgren, 885 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring that “valid reasons exist for not 
attacking the conviction earlier”). 
 280. United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit 
recently summarized its holdings regarding “valid reasons for delay” as follows: 
[W]e have considered delay to be reasonable when the applicable law was recently 
changed and made retroactive, when new evidence was discovered that the 
petitioner could not reasonably have located earlier, and when the petitioner was 
improperly advised by counsel not to pursue habeas relief. We and our sister circuits 
have rejected coram nobis petitions as untimely when the petitioner took 25 years to 
challenge an undesirable army discharge that he had not previously tried to upgrade, 
when there was a seven-year delay during which the petitioner did not exercise due 
diligence, and when the petitioner waited 16 years to relitigate a claim that had been 
raised and then dropped on direct appeal. 
Id. at 1007 (citations omitted). 
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filing their claims to the detriment of the prosecution. As the Ninth 
Circuit recently clarified, the general requirement that “valid reasons 
exist for not attacking the conviction earlier” is not a restatement of 
the doctrine of laches.281 Rather, laches “constitutes a supplemental 
defense that the government may invoke when a petitioner seeks 
coram nobis relief.”282 That is to say, a petitioner first bears the 
burden of showing that valid reasons exist for not making his or her 
claims earlier. If the petitioner succeeds in this threshold showing, 
then the government may invoke laches and claim that it is unfairly 
prejudiced by the delay (e.g., because relevant witnesses and 
evidence are no longer around). Thus, any chance that jettisoning 
the civil disabilities test will increase “sandbagging”283 to the 
disadvantage of prosecutors is (and can be) dealt with by the 
equitable doctrine of laches. 
Finally, if the abuse of writ worry turns out to be more than a 
phantom problem, there is no lack of proposed ideas to rectify it. 
Judges, legislators, lawyers, and legal academics have paid great 
attention to “abuse of writ”-type worries in the context of habeas 
corpus,284 and for better or worse, a variety of doctrines have 
developed to counter perceived abuse. The 1996 Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) codified very strict rules 
regarding successive petitions such that a petitioner filing a second or 
third habeas writ must first file the writ with a special three-judge 
panel composed of appellate judges.285 The three-judge panel must 
determine whether the writ satisfies the requirements of a successive 
petition, and only if it does so may the petitioner file the writ with 
the relevant district court.286 The successive petition provisions of 
 
 281. Id. at 1004 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th 
Cir.1987)). 
 282. Id. at 1006. 
 283. Sandbagging refers to the purposeful holding back of arguments at earlier 
procedural points for use later on further appeal or collateral review. 
 284. See generally Kyle P. Reynolds, Comment, “Second or Successive” Habeas Petitions 
and Late-Ripening Claims after Panetti v Quarterman, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1475, 1475–83 
(2007) (summarizing history of concerns about—and reactions to—abuse-of-writ problem). 
 285. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (2006). 
 286. Id. The requirements for successive habeas petitions are 
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a 
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no 
reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or 
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. 
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AEDPA have been criticized as too harsh,287 but there is no reason, 
in principle, why the “abuse of writ” rules now in force in the habeas 
context cannot be adopted in coram nobis. Already, the grounds for 
coram nobis are identical to the grounds for habeas, and it would 
promote consistency if the procedural rules were the same as well.288 
The point here is that preventing abuse of the writ is hardly an 
impossible task. Courts reviewing coram nobis petitions already have 
adequate tools to dismiss abusive petitions, and if a significant “abuse 
of writ” problem arises, the courts will benefit from the long debates 
over the same issue in habeas law and may choose to craft even 
stricter rules. In no circumstance, however, does the civil disabilities 
test present itself as a good mechanism for addressing “abuse of 
writ” worries; it simply does not address the problem. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged “the obvious fact of life 
that most criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral 
legal consequences.”289 It is now time to acknowledge the fact that 
most criminal convictions also entail reputational, professional, and 
social consequences that continue beyond, and may overshadow, the 
formal legal consequences. The function of modern coram nobis is 
precisely to provide collateral relief to those who were wrongly 
convicted but no longer face the direct punishment of criminal 
sentence. It is an “extraordinary” writ insofar as the circumstances 
that justify its issuance are rare and, one hopes, unusual. But it is a 
modest form of redress insofar as it serves only to vacate the unlawful 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2006). 
 287. In particular, the AEDPA rules appear to keep out legitimate petitions based on a 
substantive change in the interpretation of a criminal statute. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, The 
Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 699 (2002); Deborah L. Stahlkopf, Note, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: 
Successive Petitions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1115 (1998). 
 288. Indeed, Professor Yackle argues that over time there is a natural tendency for the 
procedural rules of habeas and coram nobis to converge, lest courts produce a new set of 
“shadow” rules unique to coram nobis. YACKLE, supra note 64, § 36. A comprehensive set of 
procedures for all collateral review does have some inherent appeal, though given all the 
criticisms of the AEDPA reforms, a more organic, common-law evolution of coram nobis 
procedures might result in a more just set of rules in coram nobis. Indeed, over time, habeas 
law may have much to learn from coram nobis, rather than the other way around. 
 289. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1967). 
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conviction. As the Second Circuit wrote of Robert Morgan’s coram 
nobis petition: 
The passage of many years does not cure a void conviction. Morgan 
spent four years in a federal jail under a sentence unlawfully 
imposed. Those years cannot be undone, for we mortals are unable 
to enable him to relive them out of jail or to add equivalent years 
to his span of life. The least we can do is to wipe out the record of 
conviction and its consequences.290 
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit of the late 1980s could not undo the 
totality of the injustice committed against Gordon Hirabayashi—the 
race-based curfew and evacuation orders and the months of hard 
labor that he endured in the Arizona desert,291 to say nothing of the 
years of internment suffered by his family and other Japanese 
Americans. But what the court could do was vacate the original 
conviction—“to make the judgments of the courts conform to the 
judgments of history.”292 The Ninth Circuit wisely chose not to 
create an artificial barrier to doing justice in the case of Hirabayashi. 
Unfortunately, the overwhelming majority of other circuits have 
adopted a coram nobis jurisprudence that would have denied relief 
to Hirabayashi and, in fact, denies relief to deserving petitioners 
today. 
The writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis, convoluted and 
technical as they may be, have become the mechanisms by which the 
American justice system can review final convictions, reconsider 
them, and—if necessary—vacate them. The civil disabilities test acts 
as a roadblock to the proper functioning of that mechanism, keeping 
out a whole class of post-conviction review cases for reasons that do 
not stand up to scrutiny. The damage that the civil disabilities test 
does to individuals denied justice and to systemic accuracy cannot be 
 
 290. United States v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1955). 
 291. After his conviction for violating the curfew order was upheld, Hirabayashi was 
sentenced to 90 days of labor at the Catalina Federal Honor Camp near Tucson, Arizona. See 
45 Years Later, an Apology from the U.S. Government, A&S PERSP. (Univ. of Wash. Coll. of 
Arts & Sci., Seattle, Wash.), Winter 2000, available at http://www.artsci.washington. 
edu/news/Winter00/Hirabayashi.htm. Today the site of the prison camp has been designated 
the Gordon Hirabayashi Recreation Area inside the Coronado National Forest. See UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, GORDON HIRABAYASHI RECREATION SITE: 
CORONADO NATIONAL FOREST: WHY THIS RECREATION SITE WAS NAMED AFTER A 
PRISONER (2003), available at http://ublib.buffalo.edu/libraries/e-resources/ebooks/ 
images/eey5681. 
 292. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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justified by the marginal work it does to protect the norms of finality 
and judicial economy. 
